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Abstract 
Cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias (CBM-I) has been shown to successfully 
modify interpretative biases across psychological presentations including social anxiety, 
generalised anxiety and depression. Despite the role catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily 
sensations are thought to maintain with panic disorder, to date no study has sought to explore 
the efficacy of CBM-I with individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. Six 
individuals (19 to 53 years old) with clinical levels of panic symptomatology, as measured by 
the panic disorder severity scale, completed an internet administered seven-session CBM-I 
training programme at home. A single-case series design was adopted in order to investigate 
the efficacy of the CBM-I training programme. Participants were randomised to a seven, nine 
or eleven day baseline control phase. Daily measures and outcome measures were completed. 
Visual analysis revealed that four of the six participants responded to the CBM-I training 
programme. Three participants made clinically significant and reliable change on a measure 
of panic, whilst four participants made significantly reliable change on a measure of anxiety 
sensitivity. Interpretation bias was assessed using the ranking and believability tasks of the 
Brief Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire. Four of the six participants showed a 
significant change in interpretation bias on the ranking task, whilst only two participants 
showed a change in interpretation bias in the expected direction on the believability task. The 
results indicate the potential clinical utility of CBM-I in reducing levels of panic 
symptomatology. These results need to be interpreted with caution due to the small sample 
size. Future areas for research are considered, with the potential for CBM-I to serve a 
preventative, as well as a therapeutic, function discussed. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0 Chapter Introduction 
 This chapter aims to provide an overview of panic disorder referencing diagnostic 
criteria, prevalence rates, co-morbidity and a review of the catastrophic misinterpretation 
model of panic (Clark, 1986). The focus will be on interpretation biases in the experience of 
anxiety disorders and literature on cognitive bias modification training paradigms is also 
considered. The role imagery may have to play in the refinement of cognitive bias 
modification will be appraised. The role of imagery in the experience of anxiety disorders is 
discussed alongside evidence which suggests imagery and emotion maintain a ‘preferential 
link’. Finally, the rationale to target panic symptomatology with a cognitive bias modification 
training paradigm is presented. 
1.1. Panic Disorder 
 It is not uncommon for individuals to experience a sudden increase in their heart rate 
or occasional episodes of dizziness, however it is suggested that the meaning attributed to 
such bodily sensations can have a profound effect on the experience of these symptoms 
(Kamieniecki, Wade, & Tsourtos, 1997). That is to say, benign physical sensations can be the 
cause of sudden episodes of panic if interpreted in a maladaptive manner. This section will 
build on this assertion, considering the theoretical underpinnings of panic disorder, 
culminating with a review of Clark’s (1986) Cognitive Model of Panic Disorder. The 
prevalence and co-morbidity rates of panic disorder are discussed, alongside the impact this 
observed co-morbidity has on suicidal ideation and intent. The extent to which the needs of 
individuals who demonstrate clinical levels of panic symptomatology are met is also 
considered. 
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1.1.2. Panic disorder: diagnostic criteria 
 It is not until relatively recently that panic disorder has been recognised as a 
psychological condition. For over a century, panic disorder was conceptualised as a 
psychopathological condition, a position which was reflected in research following distinct 
medical and psychological paths (Angst, 1998). It was not until 1987 when both the physical 
and psychological symptoms of panic disorder were defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual Third Edition (DSM III; APA, 1987) that panic disorder was recognised in its current 
form. In its current iteration, panic disorder is characterised by recurrent and unexpected 
panic attacks (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV manual defines a panic attack as a period which 
consists of feelings of ‘intense fear’ or ‘discomfort’ in which four or more of thirteen 
physical and psychological symptoms develop. In order for a diagnosis of panic disorder to 
be given, these recurrent and unexpected panic attacks must be present with one or more 
defined consequences which relate to ongoing concerns regarding subsequent attacks, the 
repercussions of the attacks and a notable change in behaviour. To meet diagnostic criteria 
for panic disorder, an individual’s panic attacks must not be a consequence of the 
physiological effects of a substance, medication or a given medical condition (APA, 2000). 
1.1.3. Panic disorder: prevalence 
Panic disorder is a highly prevalent anxiety disorder that is associated with significant 
impairment across the breadth of an individual’s life domains. In the United Kingdom, the 
prevalence of panic disorder has been reported as amongst the highest in Europe, (King et al., 
2008). Despite this claim, there is a level of reported variability between prevalence rates in 
the general population ranging from 1.1% (Skapinakis et al., 2011) to 10.3% (King et al., 
2008). Notwithstanding this variability in overall prevalence rates, research has consistently 
reported a clear female preponderance of panic disorder, with women suggested as twice as 
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likely as men to suffer with the condition (Angst, 1998; Bijl, Van Zessen & Ravelli, 1998; 
Grant et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2006; King et al., 2008).  
It has been suggested that panic disorder is particularly prevalent within primary care 
settings, with prevalence rates being suggested as high as 13% (Craske et al., 2002).  
Despite this, traditionally the needs of individuals with panic disorder have not been well met 
within such settings, with a failure to appropriately recognise panic symptomatology 
highlighted as a significant mediator in this observation (Roy-Byrne et al., 1999; Roy-Byrne, 
Wagner, & Schraufnagel, 2005; Spitzer et al., 1994; Teng, Chaison, Bailey, Hamilton, & 
Dunn, 2008). It has been evidenced that individuals with panic disorder demonstrate 
increased levels of disability, more utilisation of accident and emergency services and a 
greater reliance on their GP comparative to other primary care patients (Roy-Byrne et al., 
1999). Additionally, individuals experiencing panic disorder have been shown to have a 
higher incidence of substance abuse and social isolation (Klerman, Weissman, Oullette, 
Johnson, & Greenwald, 1991; Mitte, 2005; Tsao, Mystowski, Zucker, & Craske, 2005; 
Weissman, 1990).  
1.1.4. Panic disorder: co-morbidity 
Panic disorder is often co-morbid with a wide range of psychological disorders 
including other anxiety disorders, mood disorders, somatoform and pain-related disorders and 
personality disorders (Taylor, Asmundson, & Wald, 2007). It has been suggested that 
individuals who develop panic disorder are at a greater risk of developing depression, 
especially when panic disorder is present with agoraphobia (Skapinakis et al., 2011). Indeed, 
it has been suggested that major depressive disorder occurs in 50% - 65% of individuals with 
a diagnosis of panic disorder (Baldwin, 1998). The importance of this observation is apparent 
when exploring the relationship that this co-morbidity appears to hold with suicidal ideation 
and behaviour (Diaconu & Turecki, 2007). Individuals who can be considered to have a 
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‘pure’ diagnosis of panic disorder have been shown to be twice as likely as individuals with 
other psychiatric disorders, and 18 times more likely than a control condition to ideate about, 
or attempt suicide at some point in their lifetime (Weissman, Klerman, Markowitz, & 
Ouellette, 1989). When focusing purely on actual suicide attempts, individuals with ‘pure’ 
panic disorder have been shown to be five times as likely as controls to make an attempt to 
take their own life. When extending this to consider co-morbid panic, this figure is seen to 
rise to twenty-three times as more likely (Johnson, Weissman, & Klerman, 1990). When 
breaking this down further, people with panic disorder who ideate about committing suicide 
tend be younger than those who don’t report any suicidal ideation (Borden, 1994).  
Whilst the figures pertaining to the presence of suicidal ideation and intent are clearly 
alarming, little is known regarding the mechanisms which underpin this relationship. One 
particular viewpoint has stressed the importance of the co-morbidity panic disorder shares 
with depression, suggesting that these two presentations serve to reinforce one another, 
subsequently impacting on levels of hopelessness (Noyes, 1991). Indeed, Diaconu and 
Turecki (2007) highlighted lower levels of functioning associated with co-morbid panic 
disorder and depression, which may in turn impact on levels of hopelessness. 
1.1.5. Panic disorder: an overview of cognitive models 
The precise aetiology of panic disorder is currently unknown; however there is a 
substantial body of evidence supporting a cognitive perspective on the disorder (Taylor et al., 
2007). Cognitive theories (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark, 1986) posit that 
panic disorder is characterised by the catastrophic misinterpretation of interoceptive stimuli. 
Classically, an individual misinterprets a benign somatic sensation as an antecedent to an 
impending catastrophe (e.g., a heart palpitation may be interpreted as an impending heart 
attack). Clark’s Model of Panic (1986;  see Figure 1.1) suggests that the catastrophic 
misinterpretation of bodily sensations elicit and increase sympathetic arousal, which is then 
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interpreted by an individual as further evidence of impending catastrophe, with this feedback 
loop resulting in a panic attack. Clark’s model is founded upon three core assumptions. The 
first states that individuals with panic disorder will make more harm related interpretations of 
ambiguous interoceptive stimuli relating to physical and psychological harm than non-
anxious individuals. Secondly, Clark proposed that the catastrophic misinterpretation of 
bodily sensations was a unique characteristic of panic disorder. The third asserts that people 
with panic disorder maintain an interpretive bias towards internal stimuli but not for external 
events. The extent to which these assumptions are evidenced has implications for ones 
understanding of the aetiology, and subsequent treatment of panic disorder (Austin & 
Richards, 2001).  
Figure 1.1 Catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder (adapted from Clark, 1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal / External Trigger 
Perceived Threat 
Anxiety 
Physical / Cognitive 
Symptoms 
Interpretation of Sensations 
as Catastrophic 
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To date a number of reviews have been undertaken to explore the level of empirical 
evidence that supports the central assumptions of the catastrophic misinterpretation model of 
panic disorder (Austin & Richards, 2001; Cox, 1996; Khawaja & Oei, 1998). Each review 
recognised substantial empirical support for the central role catastrophic misinterpretations 
maintain in panic disorder. These reviews have, in the main, centred on studies which are 
cross sectional in their design and rely upon the administration of questionnaires to infer the 
nature of catastrophic cognitions in participants. More widely, a lack of variation in 
methodologies used across studies poses a challenge when attempting to generalise findings 
(Cox, 1996; Khawja & Oei, 1998). The use of questionnaires is susceptible to confounding 
variables such as memory bias, with the completion of measures likely to be influenced by 
the emotional state of the participants (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990). Furthermore, this approach 
has been criticised as failing to capture the implied reflexive nature of catastrophic 
interpretations, as reflected in the cognitive model (Clark, 1986).  
  In light of the discussed focus on questionnaire-based methodologies, the following 
review aims to provide an up-to-date evaluation of the catastrophic model of panic disorder 
(Clark, 1986) encompassing a wider variety of methodological procedures. The review aims 
to evaluate whether there is a clear interpretive bias towards catastrophic outcomes for 
individuals with panic disorder when compared to non-anxious individuals, and whether this 
particular bias is specific to panic disorder.  
1.1.6. Search protocol 
 Metlalib was used to search nine computerised databases, AMED, Cochrane Library, 
EBSCO, EMBASE, ERIC, MEDLINE, PsychINFO, Science Direct and Web of Knowledge. 
Metalib allows for the simultaneous search of multiple databases and was accessed through 
The University of East Anglia Network on the 3
rd
 June 2014. The Boolean search terms used 
were Interoceptive Stimuli, Catastrophic Misinterpretation, and Panic Disorder. Interoceptive 
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Stimuli was also replaced with bodily sensations and body sensations. Catastrophic 
Misinterpretations was also replaced with interpret* bias. Truncation (*) was used in order to 
ensure all variant word endings were identified by the search. The search was supplemented 
by reviewing references of retrieved papers. 
1.1.6.1. Selection criteria 
 Studies were included in the review if the primary aim of the study was to explore the 
tendency to catastrophically misinterpret interoceptive stimuli. Other inclusion criteria 
consisted of the need for the study to include quantitative analysis and to be published in 
English language peer-reviewed journals. 
 Papers were excluded from the review if they met a number of predetermined 
exclusion criteria. Papers that examined the role of catastrophic cognitions through the use of 
treatment programmes were not included in the review. Likewise, papers which focused on 
attentional rather than interpretive biases as their primary aim were excluded alongside 
papers that reported levels of catastrophic misinterpretations as a secondary aim.  
The initial Metalib search resulted in 263 returned articles, which were subsequently 
combined into 198 articles. Following this, initial screening identified 12 potentially relevant 
articles. Subsequent screening of the articles abstracts identified 8 articles that met inclusion 
criteria. A hand review of suitable papers resulted in an additional 3 articles being included in 
the review. The selection criteria adopted resulted in the identification of 11 peer reviewed 
articles, summarised in Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1 
Summary of Studies Investigating the Catastrophic Misinterpretation Model of Panic Disorder (Clark, 1986): Grouped on Basis of Methodology  
Reference Aim Participants Data Collection Main Findings 
McNally & 
Foa (1987) 
To examine the ways 
agoraphobics interpret 
ambiguous information. 
N = 27 
9 untreated agoraphobics 
9 treated agoraphobics 
9 nonanxious control 
Interpretation Questionnaire, 
Subjective Cost  
Questionnaire, Subjective 
Probability Questionnaire 
No group differences on narrow criterion of threat. 
Untreated agoraphobics made more threat related 
interpretations using broad criterion of harm (p 
<.05), and rated arousal related events as more 
costly (p <.05)than the other groups 
 
Harvey, 
Richards, 
Dziadosz & 
Swindell 
(1993) 
To clarify whether the 
catastrophic 
misinterpretation of 
internal stimuli is specific 
to PD 
N=36 
12 participants with PD 
12 participants with SAD 
12 nonanxious control 
participants 
Interpretation Questionnaire No group differences across narrow criterion of 
threat. Both PD and SAD groups more gave more 
catastrophic misinterpretations than controls when 
pooled over internal and external stimuli (p <.05). 
PD group gave higher threat ranking to internal 
stimuli than other groups (p <.05) 
 
Kamieniecki, 
Wade, & 
Tsourtos 
(1997) 
To examine whether 
people with PD 
misinterpret bodily 
sensations which are 
caused by nonanxious 
states 
N=30 
15 participants with PD 
15 nonanxious 
participants 
ISCNS, Ambiguous Stimuli 
Questionnaire 
Harm related responses not included in analyses 
due to lack of responses. PD patients provided 
more anxiety related initial interpretations than 
control group (p <.001). PD patients provided 
greater costly anxious responses than controls (p 
<.001) but no sig. difference in threatening 
responses. 
 
Clark et al. 
(1997) 
To extend results of 
McNally & Foa (1987)and 
to further examine 
specificity of catastrophic 
misinterpretations to PD 
N= 60 
20 participants with PD 
20 participants with other 
anxiety disorders 
20 nonanxious control 
group 
BSIQ PD patients made more negative interpretations of 
bodily sensations than other groups (p <.05) using 
narrow criterion of harm, and also using the broad 
criterion of harm (p <.001). PD patients ranked 
negative explanations as more likely for internal 
stimuli than other groups (p <.001) 
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Richards, 
Austin, & 
Alvarenga 
(2001) 
To investigate whether 
people at risk of 
developing PD 
demonstrate similar 
cognitive biases as those 
diagnosed with PD 
N=114 
20 participants with PD 
25 participants with non 
clinical PD 
69 nonanxious controls 
BBSIQ No significant group differences based on narrow 
criterion of threat. PD and non clinical PD 
participants made significantly more threat 
interpretations than controls on broad criterion of 
threat (p <.01). PD participants gave significantly 
higher threat ratings than controls (p <.01) but no 
observed difference with non clinical PD group 
 
Austin & 
Richards 
(2006) 
To replicate the results of 
Clark et al. (1997) 
N=113 
38 participants with PD 
20 participants with NCP 
21 participants with SAD 
34 nonanxious controls 
BSIQ-M PD participants gave more harm related responses 
than NAC’s on both initial interpretation and 
outcome response, and more than both NAC’s and 
NCP’s on the initial interpretation. PD group 
made significantly more harm interpretations than 
all groups on both measures using broad criterion 
of threat. 
 
Austin & 
Kiropoulos 
(2008) 
To examine whether 
people with PD make 
more catastrophic 
misinterpretation that 
nonanxious individuals, 
and indeed if this is 
specific to PD 
N=88 
30 participants with PD 
28 participants with SAD 
30 nonanxious controls 
Internet administered  
BSIQ-M 
PD group gave more harm related responses than 
NAC group on both initial interpretation and 
outcome response, and more than both the NAC 
and SAD groups on the outcome item using the 
narrow criterion of harm. On broad criterion of 
harm PD and SAD groups made significantly 
more harm related responses on both measures 
than the NAC group. No sig differences on 
response ranked task 
 
Schniering & 
Rapee (1997) 
To examine if individuals 
with PD are characterised 
by an enhanced tendency 
to associate benign 
somatic symptoms with 
catastrophic outcomes 
N=75 
47 participants with PD 
28 nonanxious controls 
Modified lexical decision task 
 
No sig group differences at long SOA condition or 
short SOA condition 
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Schneider & 
Schulte 
(2007) 
To investigate whether 
individuals with PD 
demonstrate stronger 
semantic priming effects 
that NAC’s for 
ideographically selected 
targets 
 
N=80 
48 PD participants 
32 nonanxious controls 
Semantic Priming Task No group differences with semantic priming 
scores at long ISI. PD patients demonstrated 
significantly higher priming for catastrophic 
targets at zero ISI p =.012 
Hermans et 
al. (2010) 
To examine whether PD is 
characterised by 
spontaneous catastrophic 
misinterpretations and if 
this is specific to PD 
 
1
N=86 
31 participants with PD 
25 anxious controls 
30 nonanxious controls 
 
2
N=70 
20 participants with PD 
20 anxious controls 
15 professionals 
15 non professionals 
 
Semantic Priming Task 
1
Significant main effect of trial type in panic 
group (p <.0001). Shorter latencies for panic-panic 
trials. Similar priming effect not evident in 
anxious control group. Significant priming effect 
(p < .05) observed in nonanxious control group. 
 
2
Both PD patients (p <.005) and mental health 
professionals (p <.05) responded significantly 
faster on panic-panic trials. There were no 
significant differences for both the anxious and 
non professional control group on panic-panic 
tasks. 
 
Breitholtz, 
Johansson & 
Ost (1999) 
To evaluate PD and GAD 
patients in relation to their 
self-reported cognitions 
N=74 
36 participants with PD 
38 participants with 
GAD 
Self Observation Significant distribution of overall cognitions 
between the groups (p <.00001). PD patients had 
significantly more catastrophic cognitions than the 
GAD patients (p< .00001). 
Note: PD = Panic disorder; ISCNS = Interpretation of sensations caused by nonanxious states; BBSIQ = Brief body sensations interpretation 
questionnaire; BSIQ = Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire; BSIQ-M = Body sensations interpretation questionnaire modified. 
Hermans et al. (2010) reported two pieces of researched denoted by 
1
 and 
2
. 
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1.1.7. Review of literature: is panic disorder characterised by an enhanced 
tendency to catastrophically misinterpret ambiguous interoceptive stimuli? 
 1.1.7.1 Questionnaire based studies 
McNally and Foa (1987) examined the ways in which individuals with agoraphobia 
and panic disorder interpret ambiguous information and whether they make more catastrophic 
interpretations of internal information than non-anxious controls. Three questionnaires were 
adapted and used from earlier measures used by Butler and Mathews (1983). Participants 
were required to rate the negative valence, the subjective probability and subjective cost of a 
variety of events. Responses were coded using broad and narrow criterions of threat. The 
broad criterion of threat included cognitions such as “I’m going to panic”; whereas a 
cognition that is consistent with the narrow criterion of threat would be “I’m going to have a 
heart attack”. In essence, the narrow criterion of threat was used to identify cognitions which 
identified a specific concern relating to physical or mental catastrophe. Those with untreated 
agoraphobia interpreted scenarios as more threatening than both treated individuals and non-
anxious controls for the broad criterion of threat but not the narrow criterion of threat. Data 
from subjective cost and probability measures suggested that non-treated individuals were 
characterised by the enhanced interpretation of threat for events relating specifically to 
arousal. As with all self-report measures, the data obtained is subject to distortion through 
processes such as emotional bias and social desirability effects (Furnham & Henderson, 
1982; Hirotsune & Kawahara, 2011). Despite this limitation, the conclusions offered by the 
authors provided general support for the catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic (Clark, 
1986).  
Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz and Swindell (1993) investigated whether the 
catastrophic misinterpretation of interoceptive stimuli was a process specific to panic 
disorder. The interpretation questionnaire as used by McNally and Foa (1987) was employed 
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to investigate catastrophic misinterpretations and was completed by individuals with panic 
disorder, social anxiety and a group of non-anxious controls. Individuals with panic disorder 
demonstrated an enhanced tendency to misinterpret ambiguous internal information, 
comparative to both socially anxious and non-anxious controls, for a ranked response task 
only. This task required participants to rank the likelihood of ambiguous internal information 
as coming to mind in various situations.  Harvey et al. (1993) suggested the activation of 
relevant core schemas accounted for the observed differences in the ranked response task. 
That is to say, ambiguous information was presented that activated a given threat-related 
thought process in individuals. Strengths of this study including the rating of independent 
scores, one of whom was a clinical psychologist, who were blind to subject diagnosis adds 
clinical relevance to the conclusions drawn. However, a fundamental criticism is the non-
exclusion of individuals with social phobia who previously experienced panic attacks (Clark 
et al., 1997). This criticism relates to the possibility that previous experiences of panic attacks 
could be consistent with a non-clinical presentation of panic symptomatology. As such 
catastrophic misinterpretations may be evident in this group questioning the specificity of this 
interpretation bias (Clark et al., 1997). 
Clark et al. (1997) developed the Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire 
(BSIQ) in response to a number of criticisms of earlier measures. The BSIQ is a modified 
version of the Interpretation Questionnaire used by McNally and Foa (1987). Individuals are 
asked questions across four domains, panic body sensations, social items, general items and 
other symptoms. The criticisms which motivated the development of the BSIQ included an 
oversight of belief ratings and an over representation of anxiety related explanations in the 
ranked response task. In their study, the authors had three groups complete the BSIQ, a panic 
group, an anxiety control group and a non-clinical group. The authors found, using the BSIQ, 
that individuals with panic disorder were more likely to infer threat related interpretations of 
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interoceptive stimuli than individuals with social anxiety, generalised anxiety and non-
anxious controls across both the narrow and broad criterions of threat. Furthermore, 
individuals with panic disorder ranked panic bodily sensation explanations as more probable 
than all other groups, as well as being more likely to believe these interpretations. A strength 
of this study focuses on the inclusion of participants with social anxiety and generalised 
anxiety. This enabled a more comprehensive assessment of the observed differences between 
panic disorder and other anxiety disorders (Austin & Richards, 2001). A potential weakness 
of this investigation is the ineffectiveness of the BSIQ in assessing the hypothesised 
automatic and reflexive nature of catastrophic misinterpretations (Schneider & Schulte, 
2007).  
Kamieniecki et al. (1997) investigated whether individuals with panic disorder 
misinterpret bodily sensations which are caused by non-anxious states. The Interpretation of 
Sensations Caused by Non-anxious States instrument (ISCNS) was designed to measure 
catastrophic misinterpretations. The ISCNS coded participant’s response as overt 
explanations and covert explanations. Should a response be classified as covert, it was rated 
as ‘anxiety-related’, harm-related’ or ‘benign’. The ISCNS was administered to fifteen 
individuals with panic disorder and fifteen control individuals.  Participants with panic 
disorder were unable to identify as many harmless explanations for bodily sensations as non-
anxious controls, with no group differences being observed across groups on threatening 
interpretations. Harm related responses were not included in the analyses resulting from a 
lack of this type of response being provided. Kamieniecki and colleagues suggested that the 
lack of harm related responses was a consequence of the concise definition they attached to 
‘harm related’. This definition centred on recognition of a serious threat to an individual’s 
physical or emotional well-being. This assertion has been challenged by Austin and Richards 
(2001) who noted that the criteria used by the authors to describe ‘harm related’ as lacking 
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clarity, alternatively citing the verbal presentation, as contributing to this lack of observed 
interpretation type. Furthermore, the results obtained by Kamieniecki et al., (1997) are 
limited by the only modest internal reliability of the ISCNS. 
Richards, Austin and Alvarenga (2001) compared cognitive biases in the 
misinterpretation of ambiguous somatic sensations in individuals with panic disorder to a 
group who were considered at risk of developing panic disorder and a control group using the 
Brief Bodily Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BBSIQ; Clark et al., 1997). Individuals 
who were deemed to be at risk of developing panic disorder had experienced at least one 
spontaneous panic attack during the previous six months, but did not satisfy DSM-IV criteria 
for panic disorder. Inconsideration of the broad criterion of threat, both individuals with panic 
disorder and those at risk of developing panic disorder made more threat interpretations than 
non-panic controls on open ended questions. There was no significant difference observed 
across the two panic groups. However, on a ranked task the individuals with panic disorder 
rated internal panic related events as significantly more likely non-anxious controls to come 
to mind. The inclusion of a non-clinical panic group offers an additional theoretical 
dimension to ones understanding of panic disorder, alongside a clinical insight into potential 
preventative measures associated with panic disorder. It follows that should an interpretation 
bias be common in both individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology and those at 
risk of developing clinical levels of panic disorder, a single clinical intervention may be able 
to serve a therapeutic and preventative function. 
Austin and Richards (2006) aimed to clarify the core assumptions of catastrophic 
misinterpretation model of panic disorder (Clark, 1986). They modified the BSIQ to include a 
follow up question in order to identify the underlying cognitions preceding an individual’s 
initial interpretation. The modified BSIQ was administered to a group of participants with 
panic disorder, a group of participants with social anxiety and a non-anxious control group. 
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Individuals with panic disorder gave more catastrophic interpretations using the narrow 
criterion of threat than non-anxious controls only. However, it was found that individuals 
with panic disorder gave more harm-related interpretations than all other groups when based 
on the broad criterion of threat. Additionally, individuals with panic disorder ranked anxiety-
related interpretations significantly higher than both the non-anxious controls and the socially 
anxious groups; no differences were observed between the panic and non-clinical panic 
groups. Individuals with a history of uncued panic attacks were excluded from the socially 
anxious group, which addresses a criticism of the sample employed by Harvey et al. (1993). 
Although, the study should be commended for the attempt to assess underlying cognitions, it 
is implausible to conclude that the inclusion of “And then what might happen” sufficiently 
achieves this. As such it would be unwise to conclude that this modification addresses this 
short fall in the BSIQ. 
 Austin and Kiropoulos (2008) aimed to further explore the core assumptions of the 
catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder through the online administration of 
the BSIQ-M. Three groups were administered the online version of the BSIQ-M, a group of 
participants with panic disorder, a group with social anxiety and a non-anxious control group. 
When focusing on the narrow criterion of threat, individuals with panic disorder were shown 
to make more catastrophic initial interpretations and subsequent outcome responses than non-
anxious controls. Differences between participants with panic disorder and all other groups, 
using the narrow criterion of threat, were evident on outcome items only. The results obtained 
by Austin and Kiropoulos mirrored those of Austin and Richards (2006) when exploring the 
broad criterion of threat. Internet administration of psychological questionnaires has 
demonstrated the potential to become an important means of gathering psychological 
information that is less susceptible to social desirability effects and is therefore feasibly more 
representative than traditional pen and paper measures (Buchanan, 2002; Fiegelson & 
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Dwight, 2000; Joinson, 1999). However, as both experimental groups consisted mainly of 
females, the extent to which the findings can be generalised is open to debate (Paul, 1967). 
1.1.7.2 Semantic priming studies 
 Schniering and Rapee (1997) employed a semantic priming task in order to address 
the reflexive nature of catastrophic misinterpretation and to investigate whether or not such 
interpretations are apparent in panic disorder.  In order to measure automatic and controlled 
processes involved in panic disorder, groups were required to make lexical decisions relating 
to neutral and threatening word pairs, across two time delay intervals. In this lexical decision 
task participants were required to determine whether words presented in the word pairs 
consisted of a proper English word.  Although a significant facilitation effect was observed 
for the threatening word pairs, the effect was found to be equally strong across both the panic 
group and the non-clinical control group. That is to say, when presented with a threatening 
prime word, recognition of the target word was significantly quicker than for neutral word 
pairs for both groups. This observed effect was consistent across both time delay conditions. 
As such the conclusions made by Schniering and Rapee contradict the notion of a specific 
misinterpretation bias in panic disorder as the threatening word facilitated an effect across 
both groups. A strength of this study lies in its methodology as this addressed many of the 
biases which are associated with self-report measures (Schneider & Schulte, 2007).  
Schneider and Schulte (2007) investigated whether individuals with panic disorder 
more strongly associated catastrophic outcomes with somatic sensations than a non-clinical 
sample. Participants were required to name catastrophic and neutral target words that 
followed primes sentences immediately or with a 1500ms delay. Consistent with Schniering 
and Rapee (1997), no differences were observed across the groups for semantic priming 
effects. However, participants with panic disorder demonstrated the expected stronger 
immediate semantic priming effects for catastrophic outcomes when using ideographically 
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selected stimuli. The outcome of this research suggested that whilst panic disorder is 
characterised by an increased tendency to misinterpret stimuli, the nature of these 
interpretations are highly idiosyncratic. The authors concluded that the experience of panic 
disorder and the cognitive errors which underlie this vary greatly and as such may not have 
been represented in the word pairs. 
Hermans et al. (2010) explored whether panic disorder is characterised by the 
catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations and whether this is a characteristic specific 
to panic disorder. In order to overcome the limitations of research based on verbal report, the 
authors used an associative priming procedure with three groups, a group of individuals with 
panic disorder, an anxious control group and a non-anxious control group. During this 
procedure participants were required to categorise words presented on a computer screen as 
‘words’ or ‘non-words’. These words included panic related words alongside neutral non-
panic related words. Individuals with panic disorder demonstrated significantly shorter 
response times for panic control trials. Whilst a similar effect was not observed for the 
anxious control group, a significant panic priming effect was observed for the non-anxious 
control group. The authors speculated that this difference was due to the high proportion of 
mental health professionals contained within the non-anxious control group, hypothesising 
that these primes are strongly associated with their professional knowledge. The authors 
investigated this hypothesis by separating the non-anxious control group with both a 
‘professionals’ non-anxious group and a ‘non-professionals’ control group. The results 
showed no significant differences in relation to priming effects for panic-panic trials 
suggesting that in certain cases groups maintain a bias similar to those seen in individuals 
with panic disorder. A particular strength of this piece of research is that the clinical 
participants were not actively engaged in a psychological intervention. Findings from CBT 
treatment studies into panic disorder have shown that cognitive interventions impact on the 
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extent to which individuals with panic disorder make catastrophic misinterpretations, (Casey, 
Newcombe, & Oei, 2005; Teachman, Marker, & Smith-Janik, 2008).  
1.1.7.3 Self-report studies 
 Breitholtz, Johansson and Ost (1999) investigated whether individuals with panic 
disorder report more cognitions relating to physical and mental catastrophes than a sample of 
individuals with a diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder. As part of a pre-treatment 
assessment, patients were asked to record experiences of panic attacks or heightened states of 
anxiety. Two independent observers, who were blind to the participants associated diagnoses, 
classified the reported cognitions using a pre-determined classification instrument.  
Individuals with panic disorder had significantly more cognitions relating to physical 
catastrophes in comparison to those generalised anxiety disorder, allowing for the conclusion 
that panic disorder is characterised by such catastrophic cognitions. The strength of 
methodology employed by the authors lies in the randomisation of cognitions and that the 
independent raters were blind as to diagnosis (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996).  An omnipresent 
limitation of self-report measures lies in the potential that data are subject to distortion 
through extraneous variables such as desirability effects and emotional bias (Furnham & 
Henderson, 1982; Hirotsune & Kawahara, 2011). 
1.1.8. Summary of literature review 
 This review proposed to evaluate the extent to which panic disorder is characterised 
by an enhanced tendency to catastrophically misinterpret interoceptive stimuli and whether 
this is disorder specific. As evidenced by this review, research has provided empirical support 
for the role, and specificity, of catastrophic misinterpretations in panic disorder (e.g., Austin 
& Richards, 2006; Clark et al., 1997). One of the main areas of discrepancy, as highlighted 
by this review, is the variation of results obtained by the studies across narrow and broad 
criterions of threat. That is, results based on the broad criterion of threat consistently 
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supported the core assumptions of Clark’s (1986) cognitive model of panic disorder (e.g., 
Austin & Kiropoulos, 2008; Kamieniecki et al., 1997), whereas such a level of consistency 
was not observed across the narrow criterion of threat. Clark et al. (1997) suggested this 
discrepancy relates to the underlying cognitive content of anxiety responses, specifically 
anxiety responses mask catastrophic misinterpretations. More generally, McNally (1999) 
discussed this inconsistency as being reflective of the largely unfalsifiable nature of the 
catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder. With this in mind, future research 
exploring the underlying cognitions in panic disorder would help to address this seemingly 
omnipresent criticism. Alongside this, consideration should be given to wider, subtle, issues 
including the nature of samples, such as their professional backgrounds and genders, and how 
this can markedly influence results as observed by Hermans at el. (2010).  
The articles contained in this review offer a wide ranging evaluation of the 
catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations in panic disorder. The results and 
conclusions discussed are susceptible to subtle variations in sample dynamics and procedural 
intricacies. In the main, the studies reviewed support the position that panic disorder is 
characterised by an enhanced tendency to catastrophically misinterpret somatic sensations 
and that this is a distinguishing attribute specific to panic disorder.   
1.2. Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) 
 As previously discussed, there is a substantial body of evidence supporting the central 
role of the catastrophic misinterpretation of interoceptive stimuli in the onset and 
maintenance of panic disorder (e.g., Austin & Richards, 2001; Cox, 1996; Khawaja & Oei, 
1998). This section will consider and evaluate a growing body of evidence exploring the 
causality of interpretive biases more widely in anxiety disorders through the modification of 
such biases. The potential clinical value of interpretation modification paradigms is then 
considered within the context of panic disorder.  
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1.2.1. Causality of interpretation bias in anxiety disorders 
 The importance of interpretation biases has long been recognised by cognitive models 
of anxiety (e.g., Beck et al., 1985; Clark, 1986)  with these biases often representing a target 
of cognitive interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT; Grey & Mathews, 
2000; Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). The importance of these biases is further 
substantiated when reflecting on the efficacy of the interventions which cite them as 
contributory factors to distress. Indeed, CBT has been shown to be an efficacious intervention 
for a wide range of psychological disorders (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). 
 Building on the causality of interpretation bias in anxiety disorders, Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998) proposed a model of ‘selective processing’ in which it is suggested that 
incoming information is processed by competing evaluation systems. It is the role of these 
systems to categorise information as threatening or positive. Threatening information is 
screened by the ‘threat evaluation system’ (TES), whilst positive information is processed by 
the ‘positive evaluation system’ (PES). When incoming information is received, it is attended 
to and processed by both systems. The resulting emotional outcome is a consequence of an 
interaction between stored representations and prior experience. This interaction ultimately 
dictates whether the TES or the PES is activated. The activated system then becomes 
dominant suppressing the other system, strengthening a given emotional experience.  It is 
proposed that individuals who are deemed to be susceptible to anxious states, process 
information that corresponds to information held within in the TES. The processing of this 
information by the TES then inhibits the PES, over time resulting in the strengthening of a 
threatening interpretation bias. Furthermore, it is suggested that this established interpretation 
bias becomes more sensitive to activation when presented with potentially ambiguous stimuli. 
The ‘selective processing’ model conceptualises the TES and the PES as competing 
processes. Mathews and Mackintosh suggest that by explicitly attending to the positive 
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attributes of received information at an early stage of processing, negative biases can be 
inhibited through the activation of the PES. 
1.2.2. Cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I) 
In order to provide evidence for their ‘selective processing model’, Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) developed a task called Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation 
(CBM-I), in which individuals were presented with a scenario which remained ambiguous 
until the final word which was presented as a word fragment. Participants were required to 
read each scenario before completing the word fragment. Upon resolution of the word 
fragment, the scenario is either valenced in a benign, positive or negative way. To ensure that 
participants understood the information presented to them in the scenario, they were then 
required to complete a comprehension question to verify their understanding. Participants 
were required to complete numerous scenarios, all of which were related to social threat, an 
example follows: 
 
 ‘Your partner asks you to go to an anniversary dinner that their company is holding. 
You have not met any of their work colleagues before. Getting ready to go, you think that the 
new people you will meet will find you (bo___g or fri____y)’.  
 
Will you be disliked by your new acquaintances? (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
 
Through the repeated presentation of ambiguous scenarios, it is proposed that 
interpretation biases in a given direction are able to be induced in individuals (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998).  
 CBM-I provides a platform from which to investigate the amenability of cognitive 
biases to be modified or induced through the repeated exposure of a particular emotional 
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valence. It permits the measurement of change in emotion and the potential establishment of 
an interpretive bias in an individual. To establish causality between interpretation biases and 
anxiety, CBM-I needs to be successful in inducing given processing biases, and the effects 
this has on emotion quantified.  
1.2.3. Cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I): analogue studies 
 Early research was conducted by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) in order to further 
investigate the principles underpinning their ‘selective processing’ model. Initially, they 
reported findings from five different experiments. In the first of these experiments, an 
analogue sample was randomised to positive or negative text based CBM-I training. The 
authors employed a recognition test and a recognition time task to measure interpretation. 
The recognition time task measured the time it took participants to complete positive and 
negative word fragments. They found that individuals who were subjected to positive CBM-I 
training resolved positive word fragments quicker than participants who had been assigned to 
the negative training group. These results, paired with an observed change in anxiety in the 
expected direction, were identified as evidence of the causality interpretive biases in anxiety. 
Next, Mathews and Mackintosh removed the necessity for participants to complete word 
fragments in the training phase to investigate whether completing word fragments was 
necessary in observing change. Despite removing the need to complete word fragments, 
changes in interpretive bias were comparable to those elicited in experiment one. However, 
no changes in levels of state anxiety were evident. The authors then conducted a further three 
experiments focusing in part on the implications of ‘active’ training and ‘passive’ training. 
‘Active’ training refers to the ‘active’ resolution of the word fragments, where as in ‘passive’ 
training individuals are presented with the emotionally valenced scenario in its entirety. In 
summary, these three experiments showed that the ‘active’ generation of relevant meanings 
was fundamental to the observation of changes in state anxiety. This active generation of 
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personally relevant meanings within CBM-I training has since been substantiated (Hoppitt, 
Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010). Of importance was the assertion that results of their 
studies were consistent with a causal link between an interpretive bias and emotion. 
  Yiend, Mackintosh, and Mathews (2005) explored the temporal characteristics and 
durability of induced interpretative biases. Yiend and colleagues demonstrated that induced 
interpretative biases, using the CBM-I, were durable over a 24 hour period within an 
analogue sample. Despite the significance of this finding, the authors highlighted the lack of a 
baseline measure of interpretation bias as a limiting factor in the extent to which conclusions 
could be drawn regarding the causality of interpretation biases in anxiety. The omission of a 
baseline measures raises questions regarding the potential performance of participants prior 
to completing CBM-I training. 
Similarly, Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, and Cook (2006) investigated the 
durability of interpretation biases in an analogue sample and the extent to which they survive 
changes in context. Participants completed CBM-I training in one of two groups, either via a 
computerised platform or through a pencil and paper format, accessed in a group setting. The 
effects of training were measured 24 hours following CBM-I training with all participants 
completing the pencil and paper group format. As such, half of the participants experienced a 
change in context between sessions. Mirroring Yiend et al. (2005), interpretation biases were 
found to persist for a period of at least 24 hours and additionally they were shown to survive 
changes in context. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated evidence of change in emotional 
vulnerability congruent with the training condition to which a participant was assigned. 
Mackintosh and colleagues summarised the importance of these results in relation to their 
clinical relevance, and the potential for CBM-I to be developed into a therapeutic 
intervention. 
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Whilst the studies discussed to date have sought to comprehend the impact CBM-I 
has on state anxiety, Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook and Yiend (2007) explored the effects  
CBM-I has on trait anxiety. Individuals who were considered to be ‘high-trait anxious’ were 
required to complete four sessions of positive CBM-I text-based training over a four week 
period. Following completion of the four sessions of CBM-I, individuals made more positive 
interpretations of novel descriptions compared to individuals in a control condition who did 
not receive CBM-I training. Additionally, it was observed that individuals who received 
CBM-I training demonstrated a significant reduction in trait anxiety scores when compared to 
the test-retest control group, with this effect observable at one week follow up. These results 
offer an important bridge highlighting the impact that CBM-I training has on state and trait 
anxiety. With this in mind, the authors provided further support to the causal role 
interpretation biases maintain with anxiety, and further hint at the potential clinical utility of 
CBM-I. 
In a further study, Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt (2007) examined the validity of 
the CBM-I paradigm. They proposed that tools typically used to measure interpretation bias 
in this field of research, the recognition task and the reaction time measure, were related to 
the training paradigm to such a degree that it may impact on observed outcomes. In 
expanding this point the authors highlight this closeness leads participants to be aware of the 
valence of their training condition and therefore potentially leading to confounding variables. 
As such, the authors included two additional measures of interpretation bias, one a 
homograph task, the second an open-ended questionnaire. The recognition task and a reaction 
measure were also included. When comparing positive and negative text-based CBM-I 
training, Salemink and colleagues found the positive training paradigm to be successful in 
changing interpretations when measured by the recognition and reaction time test only. 
Following positive training, participants demonstrated a reduction in trait and state anxiety 
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scores, with levels of state anxiety increasing following negative interpretation training. No 
changes were observed for the negative training condition. When using the additional 
measures of interpretation bias, no effects of the interpretation training were indicated. The 
authors suggested a number of reasons which may motivate this lack of observed bias. 
Firstly, the additional measures of interpretation bias lack the appropriate power to identify 
changes, with a subsequent power calculation confirming this suggestion specifically relating 
to the homograph task. With regards to the open-ended questionnaire, they discussed the 
potential for the measure to lack the sensitivity to identify a non-clinical interpretation bias 
owing to its development using a clinical sample. The authors highlighted the potential for 
higher baselines of anxiety, compared to those evidenced in Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000), as a factor behind this lack of significant change. 
In an attempt to explore the aforementioned, Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt 
(2009) aimed to modify a negative interpretation bias in highly anxious individuals, and 
assess the impact this has on various clinical measures. Participants were randomised to 
either a positive CBM-I training condition or a control CBM-I training condition and were 
required to complete eight daily sessions of CBM-I. In an attempt to resolve some of the 
ambiguities brought by their previous research, the authors supplemented their research with 
a more comprehensive battery of measures which were completed pre and post-training. 
Reflecting the methodology adopted by Mackintosh et al. (2006), they included a stressor 
task as a means of measuring the effect CBM-I may have on emotional vulnerability. 
Participants who completed the positive CBM-I training were found to be less state and trait 
anxious than those individuals who received the control CBM-I training. Consistent with 
their previous research (Salemink et al. 2007), no bias was observed when using the open-
ended questionnaire with this being attributed to the potential that CBM-I fails to impact on 
‘self-reported’ interpretations.  
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 Steinman and Teachman (2010) examined the role of negative interpretations in 
individuals with high anxiety sensitivity. This paper can be seen to be of particular 
importance within the context of the present study, due to the links anxiety sensitivity is 
believed to hold with panic disorder (Cox, Endler, & Swinson, 1995; McNally, 2002; Smits, 
Powers, Cho, & Telch, 2004). Anxiety sensitivity has been identified as a risk factor in 
developing clinical levels of panic symptomatology (McNally, 2002; Plehn & Peterson, 
2002). Additionally, anxiety sensitivity has also been suggested as the mechanism that 
motivates Clark’s (1986) vicious cycle of panic (Taylor, 1994). Participants were randomised 
to a positive CBM-I training condition or one of two control conditions in which participants 
received neutral CBM-I training or no training at all. Participants who received positive 
CBM-I training demonstrated a significant shift in interpretations of novel scenarios in the 
anticipated direction. Furthermore, participants assigned to the positive training condition 
demonstrated a reduction in levels of anxiety sensitivity. Based on the close links anxiety 
sensitivity is thought to maintain with panic disorder, the authors also included the BBSIQ as 
an exploratory measure of interpretation bias. Despite positive CBM-I training having no 
significant effect on the BBSIQ, a small to moderate effect size was observed in the 
anticipated direction. The authors suggested that the lack of significant effect may be due to 
the close proximity between pre and post administration of the measure. Whilst the results 
pointed to the potential of CBM-I to have clinical utility, there are a number of limitations 
that need to be considered. Firstly, as only the immediate impact of training was assessed, it 
is difficult to surmise the durability of the observed effects. Secondly, adopting multi-session 
CBM-I rather than the single-session methodology used would have enabled the authors to 
better determine the effects of training on emotional vulnerability (Steinman and Teachman, 
2010). 
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1.2.4. Cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I): clinical samples 
 CBM-I research employing analogue samples has demonstrated that it is possible to 
induce interpretive biases in individuals (e.g., Steinman & Teachman, 2010; Yiend et al., 
2005). Furthermore, this body of evidence suggested that by inducing a positive interpretation 
bias, levels of state and trait anxiety could be reduced (e.g., Mathews et al., 2007; Salemink et 
al., 2007). In order to assess the potential for CBM-I to be considered as a therapeutic tool, it 
is necessary to replicate these results using clinical samples. To date there has been an 
increasing number of studies exploring the effects of CBM-I training paradigms with a 
number of anxiety disorders. Studies exploring the efficacy of CBM-I training paradigm in 
those with clinical levels of depression is discussed in section 1.3.3. 
1.2.4.1. Social anxiety 
One of the first studies to explore the effects of CBM-I training within a clinical 
sample was conducted by Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith and Clark (2007) who examined 
the modification of interpretive biases in social anxiety. Participants were randomised to 
single-session positive, benign (non-negative) or control conditions. In a departure from the 
studies that have previously been discussed, the authors presented training scenarios aurally. 
Using a recognition task as a measure of interpretation bias, participants randomised to the 
benign training conditions (positive and non-negative) generated less negative interpretations 
of ambiguous social situations when compared to the control condition. Furthermore, 
participants who received benign training reported lower levels of anticipatory anxiety in 
relation to future social situations when compared to controls, as well as expectations of 
better social performance, although this trend was non-significant. Although speculative, the 
authors suggested that the acquisition of an interpretation bias impacts subsequent self-
imagery, although this assertion requires further research.  
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Beard and Amir (2008) utilised a varied multi-session approach which comprised 
eight training sessions completed over a four week period. In a departure from the widely 
used test-based training paradigm developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), Beard and 
Amir developed a task which required participants to determine whether a positive, benign or 
threat word related to an ambiguous socially orientated sentence. Following their responses, 
participants received feedback which was intended to reinforce a benign interpretation bias. 
Completion of the benign training task successfully decreased threat interpretation in 
participants. This decrease in threat related interpretation was accompanied with significant 
reductions in levels of trait anxiety, depression and social anxiety when compared to a control 
condition. In order to determine whether the change in interpretation bias mediated the 
change social anxiety, Beard and Amir conducted a mediation analysis using both threat and 
benign interpretations as potential mediators. The subsequent analysis revealed that the 
induction of a benign interpretation was a significant mediator in the reduction of reported 
levels of social anxiety, whilst change in threat interpretation bias was not. The authors 
concluded that whilst their findings suggest the induction of a benign bias and a reduction in 
threat bias may lead to reductions in social anxiety, it is unclear as to whether or not both 
types of bias need to be modified to elicit change in social anxiety. Additionally the authors 
cited the lack of long-term follow up, as impacting the extent to which the durability of the 
effects of training can be concluded.  
To explore the feasibility and acceptability of CBM-I, Turner et al. (2011) adopted a 
single-case series methodology with six individuals recovering from first episode psychosis. 
Participants demonstrated clinical levels of social phobia as measured by the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002). Participants completed a computerised single-session CBM-I training 
session with mood and interpretation bias being measured pre and post-session. Following 
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CBM-I training participants engaged in a behavioural task which aimed to make them 
experience moderate levels of anxiety. The authors reported that following completion of 
CBM-I all participants reported an improvement in mood, with three participants evidencing 
a successful modification of negative interpretation bias. The extent to which the results of 
the study support the feasibility of CBM-I as a clinical intervention appears rather fragile in 
light of a number of limitations relating to the methodology. Firstly, a multi-session 
methodology would have been preferable to the single-session approach used in light of 
previous evidence (Beard & Amir, 2008; Salemink et al., 2009). Secondly, the in-vivo 
behavioural task assessing social anxiety may have skewed findings with the authors 
speculating the potential for this behavioural task to impact on interpretation bias. In light of 
these limitations, the extent to which the results of the study can be generalised is uncertain, 
although one can cautiously construe them as hinting to the potential feasibility of CBM-I as 
a clinical intervention.  
1.2.4.2. Generalised anxiety disorder 
Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009) randomised participants with high levels of 
worry comparable to generalised anxiety, to either a benign CBM-I training condition or a 
control condition. The authors assessed the results by use of a breathing focus task which 
required participants to categorise the emotional valence of cognitive intrusions. Participants 
who were randomised to the benign CBM-I training were shown to record fewer negative 
thought intrusions and greater residual working memory during the breathing focus task. 
Whilst the inclusion of assessor-rated measures strengthened the reliability of the study, the 
lack of an interpretation bias measure is a fundamental weakness of the methodology used. 
Consequently, conclusions relating causality cannot be made with any confidence, however it 
is important to note the encouraging impact that completion of the CBM-I training task had 
on the presentation of generalised anxiety. 
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In an adaptation of the methodology employed by the aforementioned study, Hayes, 
Hirsch, Krebs and Mathews (2010) included a measure of interpretation bias to explore 
causality. Mirroring the results obtained by Hirsch et al. (2009), participants who completed 
the benign CBM-I training task reported fewer negative cognitive intrusions than the control 
group. On the measure of interpretation bias, participants completing CBM-I successfully 
demonstrated an induced benign bias. When reflecting on causality, the authors suggested 
that the induced bias mediated the interaction between negative intrusions and the completion 
of the benign CBM-I training. Such suggestions offer evidence of the causation between 
interpretation biases and anxiety symptomatology, illustrating the potential for CBM-I to be 
developed into an efficacious clinical tool. 
 Moving the body of CBM-I research forward, Salemink, Kindt, Rienties, and van den 
Hout (2014) conducted a randomised controlled trial of CBM-I with individuals with a range 
of anxiety disorders including panic, social anxiety and generalised anxiety. Participants 
completed eight sessions of CBM-I training online, with a three month follow-up assessment 
included in the study. Individuals who were randomised to the positive training condition 
endorsed more positive interpretations, and less negative ones than a placebo control group. 
Interestingly, a reduction in anxiety, depression and overall psychological distress was 
present for both conditions. The authors highlight the potential for confounding variables 
relating to the accessing of CBM-I at home and the lack of specificity of disorder relevant 
training material as potential limiting factors to the observed effects of training. Additionally, 
the authors cite a lack of baseline measure of interpretation bias alongside a relatively small 
sample size which impacts on the ability to draw inferences regarding the causality of 
interpretative biases in emotion. 
 
 
 31 
 
1.2.5. CBM-I research: what’s next? 
 Research has demonstrated that interpretive biases can be induced in individuals and 
that said biases can be seen to impact on levels of state and trait anxiety (e.g., Mathews et al., 
2007). A significant proportion of this research has focused largely on analogue samples to 
demonstrate the causality of interpretive biases in anxiety (e.g., Yiend et al., 2005). One of 
the most apparent research implications arising from previous research is the need to further 
extend the application of CBM-I training to clinical samples. When considering the potential 
clinical utility of CBM-I, it is important that future research continues to develop and expand 
upon earlier clinical studies (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2009; Turner et al., 2011) to include other 
anxiety disorders such as panic disorder. This shift towards a greater focus on samples with 
clinical levels of psychological distress will enhance and further validate the causal 
relationship interpretive biases are said to maintain with anxiety, whilst also enabling an 
appreciation of the potential clinical utility of CBM-I.   
When contemplating the future of CBM-I research, it is important to consider how 
methodologies can be optimised and refined. A key variation across past research has been 
the number of CBM-I training sessions participants have been required to complete. This 
distinction has been split broadly into single-session CBM-I (e.g., Steinman & Teachman, 
2010) and multi-session CBM-I (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008). When comparing the efficacy of 
CBM-I, Hallion and Ruscio (2011) found that multi-session CBM-I demonstrated 
significantly larger effect sizes when compared against single-session CBM-I.  Despite this 
observed difference between single-session and multi-session CBM-I, the construct of multi-
session CBM-I is crude and lacks specificity. Future research which focuses on the optimum 
exposure to CBM-I training would serve a purposeful function in clarifying this position 
(Beard, 2011). 
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 In moving towards demonstrating the clinical utility of CBM-I, the extent to which 
the effects of an induced bias are durable needs to be better understood. To date, a common 
omission from CBM-I research has been the lack of follow up point (e.g., Beard & Amir, 
2008). Consequently, whilst well positioned to evidence the causality of interpretation bias in 
anxiety, research has largely failed to adequately demonstrate that these changes are durable. 
Future CBM-I research needs to address this shortcoming if CBM-I is to be seen as clinically 
beneficial.  Similarly, the majority of CBM-I research has been based in the laboratory which 
restricts the extent to which observed changes are generalisable to more naturalistic settings. 
Future research is required to shift from its focus on laboratory-based analogue studies to 
naturalistic clinical studies in order to observe if changes are generalised to real-world 
contexts (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). 
1.3. Imagery, Emotion and Cognitive Bias Modification 
This section will consider the link imagery is said to maintain with emotion and the 
evidence base upon which this link is founded. The importance of imagery in psychological 
disorders is discussed and considered. With reference to the importance of imagery in 
established psychological interventions, the potential for imagery to optimise CBM-I training 
will be evaluated. Research which has sought to determine the importance of imagery in 
CBM-I will be reviewed and discussed. 
1.3.1. Mental imagery and emotion 
 Mental imagery can be considered to be a wide ranging construct encompassing a 
variety of processes which draw upon a number of neuronal pathways (O’Craven & 
Kanwisher, 2000). Despite this variability, mental imagery can be best understood as the 
recreation of perceptual experiences which can be seen to straddle sensory domains (Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Pearson, 2007). Indeed, mental imagery is underpinned by 
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neuronal processes which are similar to those activated by the initial perception of actual 
events (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
 Despite the complexities involved in the experience of mental imagery, it has been 
suggested that mental imagery and emotion maintain a ‘preferential link’ comparative to 
other processing modalities (Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh & Dalgleish, 2008). A 
consequence of this ‘preferential link’ resides in the understanding that mental images induce 
more pronounced affective responses in comparison to relative verbal representations 
(Mathews, Ridgeway, & Holmes, 2013; Picet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011). 
Despite the potential clinical and research related importance of this held belief, empirical 
research supporting this assumption remains inadequate (Holmes & Mathews, 2005).  
When aiming to better understand the mechanisms supporting this ‘preferential link’, 
Holmes and Mathews (2010) highlighted three relevant bodies of evidence. The first of these 
perspectives focuses on an evolutionary sensitivity between imagery and basic emotion. That 
is, the evolution of basic emotions preceded the evolution of more complex cognitive 
abilities. Ohman and Mineka (2001) suggested that emotional responses extend from systems 
which are relatively detached and protected from the influence of higher order cognitive 
processing abilities. A second body of evidence explores the link between imagery, 
perception and emotion and the overlap between these domains. Baddeley and Andrade 
(2000) demonstrated that simultaneous performance of a visuo-spatial and auditory task, 
negatively impacts on the vividness of visual and auditory image. Further evidence of such an 
overlap between cognitive processes emanates from research utilising neuro-imaging 
techniques (e.g., Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Kosslyn & 
Thompson, 2003; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007). Finally, the relationship between 
mental imagery, emotion and autobiographical memory is discussed. Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce (2000) suggested that emotional events are stored in an individual’s autobiographical 
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memory in the form of images, dictating that newly formed images are representative of such 
personally significant emotions.  
  When considering the multitude of pathways that mental imagery and emotion may 
interact with, it seems implausible to suggest that a single factor is responsible for the 
relationship mental imagery is said to hold with emotion. Whilst the very nature of this 
relationship remains unclear, it is apparent that mental imagery and emotion maintain a close, 
if not inextricable, relationship.    
1.3.2. Mental imagery and psychological disorders 
 When considering the evidence detailing the link that mental imagery is believed to 
hold with emotion, it can be of little surprise that mental imagery is said to play a central role 
in a number of psychological disorders. One of the most researched psychological disorders 
in relation to imagery has been post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 2000). The 
driving force behind this focus on PTSD relates to imagery in the form of flashbacks 
constituting the hallmark of the disorder (Ehlers, Hackman, & Michael, 2004).   
 A second psychological disorder in which imagery is understood to be centrally 
implicated is social anxiety. Individuals with social anxiety typically perceive social 
interactions in which they may be judged or evaluated by others as anxiety provoking. 
Socially anxious individuals repeatedly report distressing and recurrent imagery of a past 
event (Hackman, Clark, & McManus, 2000) with the experience of said imagery represented 
in contemporary cognitive models of the disorder (Clark, 1999; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Of interest to the present study is the role of imagery in panic disorder, although this 
area of research has been identified as lagging behind research into imagery and other anxiety 
disorders (McTeague, Lang, Laplante, & Bradley, 2011). Ottaviani and Beck (1987) 
investigated the nature of imagery in individuals with panic disorder. The authors noted that 
individuals with panic disorder described experiencing imagery that centred on physical and 
 35 
 
mental catastrophes. Whilst, the imaginal ideation of danger is central to the maintenance of 
panic disorder, the extent to which these conclusions are relevant in the context of the current 
discussion is tentative. More contemporary research has utilised neuro-imaging techniques to 
explore the role of imagery in panic disorder. For example, Bystritsky et al. (2001) employed 
fMRI techniques to identify neural constructs associated with the experience of imagery in 
panic disorder. The authors concluded that individuals with panic disorder showed increased 
activity in a number of brain areas comparative to non-panic controls. It can be suggested that 
imagery has a powerful impact upon felt emotion within panic disorder and psychopathology 
more generally. When considering the effects mental imagery has upon emotion and the 
maintenance of psychological distress, it is important to consider the ways in which this 
relationship can be utilised in the treatment of such psychological distress (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010). 
1.3.3. Mental imagery and cognitive bias modification for interpretation  
(CBM-I) 
 One of the challenges facing CBM-I research moving forward focuses on how these 
paradigms can be optimised in order to further demonstrate their clinical utility. Increasingly, 
CBM-I research has sought to utilise the link mental imagery holds with emotion in this 
process. 
 Holmes and Mathews (2005) reported two experiments which sought to compare the 
effects of mental imagery focused interpretation training against verbally focused 
interpretation training. Experiment one aimed to test the hypothesis that self-generated 
imagery accounted for the outcomes observed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000). 
Participants followed a comparative procedure to that employed by Mathews and 
Mackintosh, with the additional instructions to imagine themselves in the event, or to focus 
on the meaning of the words presented. The authors reported that individuals who imagined 
 36 
 
themselves in the event reported greater increases in state anxiety than those participants in 
the verbal-semantic training condition. Similarly, emotionality ratings of ambiguous test 
descriptions also increased more in the imagery than in the verbal-semantic training 
condition. However, the focus on negative emotionally valenced effects overlooks the 
potential implications of imagery in the induction of a benign or positive bias. In responding 
to this shorting-coming, Holmes and Mathews reported a second experiment which included 
a benign training condition. As in the earlier study, the authors observed that negative 
valenced imagery resulted in greater increases in anxious mood than did comparative verbal 
processing. Despite the role of imagery on negative bias being replicated, no evidence of an 
effect of imagery versus verbal processing was found with benign training. The authors noted 
that the sample of participants used by the study may have not had sufficiently high levels of 
state anxiety for benign training to reveal any significant reductions.     
Holmes, Mathews, Dalgliesh and Mackintosh (2006) focused on the effect of an 
overtly positive interpretation training paradigm on mood. A group of non-clinical 
participants were randomised to either an imagery or verbal processing positive CBM-I 
training condition. Participants allocated to the imagery focused group were required to 
image the positive scenarios, whilst participants assigned to the verbal processing group were 
instructed to concentrate on the verbal meaning of the scenarios. The authors found that 
participants who were assigned to the mental imagery group reported greater increases in 
positive affect and greater decreases in state anxiety than did those participants who were in 
the verbal processing condition. Despite the small sample size adopted by the authors, these 
results offer support for position that positive interpretation training can be enhanced through 
imagery as opposed to verbal-semantic processing. 
 Holmes, Lang and Shah (2009) reported two experiments using non-clinical 
participants which sought to test whether positive imagery CBM-I would extend to a 
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depressive bias. Firstly, participants were randomised to either an imagery focused or 
verbally focused CBM-I training condition. In line with previous research (e.g., Holmes et 
al., 2006), participants who completed imagery based CBM-I training demonstrated greater 
increases in positive mood and interpretive bias than those participants randomised to the 
verbal-semantic condition. Unexpectedly, individuals who received verbally focused CBM-I 
training indicated increases in anxiety over the training phase. When contemplating this 
unforeseen consequence of the verbal training condition, the authors stressed the importance 
of comprehending what aspect of verbal processing may have lead to an increase in anxiety. 
Consequently, Holmes et al. (2009) reported a second experiment which explored the 
hypothesis that participants were making unfavourable comparisons between the overtly 
positive training materials and their own personal experiences. The authors noted that 
increases in anxiety in additional verbal comparison conditions supported the hypothesis that 
comparative verbal processing contributed to the findings of the first experiment. The 
outcomes of this research suggested that imagery focused positive CBM-I may have clinical 
utility in the context of depressed mood.  
 More recently, the clinical utility of imagery focused CBM-I for depression has been 
substantiated through the use of multi-session interpretation training paradigms (Blackwell & 
Holmes, 2010; Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012).  Blackwell and Holmes 
(2010) sought to determine the clinical value of CBM-I by testing the impact completion of 
imagery focused training has on interpretation bias and depressed mood outside of a 
laboratory setting. Participants completed interpretation training at home daily for a period of 
seven days with depressive symptoms assessed at a two week follow up point. Of the seven 
participants included in the research, four demonstrated improvements in mood and bias, with 
these improvements being maintained at follow up. The authors noted that feedback provided 
by the participants highlighted the importance of providing a rationale to engage in what can 
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be perceived as a long a tedious task. This point has clear implications in the utilisation of 
CBM-I training. When focusing on the role of imagery, the authors reported that imagery 
coaching elicited a reduction in negative mood for one participant, although this 
improvement was not maintained when prompts were removed.  
 Lang et al. (2012) further enhanced the support for the clinical utility of a positive 
imagery-focused CBM-I task for those with clinical levels of depression. In their study, 
individuals with depression completed either seven daily sessions of positive imagery 
focused CBM-I or a control condition at home. For individuals completing the positive 
imagery CBM-I condition, the authors reported significant improvements between pre-
intervention and post-intervention measures of depressive symptomatology, cognitive bias 
and intrusive symptoms compared to the control condition. Whilst the results reported 
provide further support to the clinical utility of computerised CBM-I tasks, the authors 
highlighted that the methodology adopted by the study does not enable inferences to be made 
with regards to the mechanisms of change underpinning the observed improvements. As a 
means of addressing this limitation, Lang et al. (2012) suggested the inclusion of a non-
imagery control group in future research as a prudent measure. 
 Steel et al. (2010) reported on an imagery focused CBM-I training programme which 
aimed to treat anxiety in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. Participants were 
randomised to a single-session CBM-I training task or a single control session, with 
participants in the CBM-I condition receiving instructions to simulate the scenarios via 
mental imagery. Unexpectedly, participants completing the CBM-I training task did not 
demonstrate a reduction in state anxiety or change in interpretation bias. Despite this lack of 
observed change, the authors noted a significant positive relationship between participants 
rated use of imagery within everyday life and change in interpretation bias, suggesting that 
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those individuals who had a tendency or ability to engage in mental imagery were more 
amenable to an induced positive interpretation bias.  
1.3.4. Clinical and research implications  
It would appear that mental imagery has an important role to play in the optimisation 
of CBM-I training procedures. The inclusion of mental imagery within both negative and 
positive interpretation training has demonstrated greater changes in interpretation bias and 
emotion comparative to verbally focused CBM-I training (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). Despite 
the potential benefits of imagery focused CBM-I there are a number of points which warrant 
consideration. 
Whilst exploring the potential benefits imagery may hold in CBM-I training, a 
number of studies have found an increase in negative affect in certain training conditions 
(Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2009; Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2009). In order to 
determine the effects of imagery on CBM-I training, research has typically sought to draw 
participant’s attention to the semantics of a training scenario or to fully immerse themselves 
in the imagery associated with such tasks via auditory presentation of stimuli (e.g., Holmes et 
al., 2006). Holmes et al., (2006) highlighted the possibility that a focus on the semantics of a 
scenario may have proved arduous, the experience of which underpinning the observed 
change in mood. Seeking to determine the optimum methodology to enhance the effects of 
CBM-I training, Standage et al., (2009) compared the visual and auditory presentation of 
information. Assuming the importance of engaging in mental imagery, the authors instructed 
participants to imagine themselves in each scenario regardless of assigned training condition. 
They hypothesised that the auditory presentation of information would be preferable as it 
could be considered more conducive with the processing of information via mental imagery. 
Contrary to their hypothesis, they found that auditory presentation of information led to a 
deterioration in mood. When attempting to account for this unexpected observation, the 
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authors noted the increase in testing time associated with the auditory condition may have 
influenced the deterioration in mood. This point can be seen to hold important similarities 
with the assertion of Holmes and colleagues, that a task which is arduous in nature may 
temper, or even nullify, the potential benefits of CBM-I training. When considering this point 
clinically, it seems important that participants engaging in CBM-I training have the ability to 
control the pace at which they engage with the training task and that this can be best 
facilitated through the visual presentation of stimuli (Standage et al. 2009).   
 An important question to consider, when appreciating the potential role imagery has 
to play in CBM-I training, focuses on the ability or tendency for individuals to engage in 
mental imagery. Firstly, it is important to note that there are differences in the extent to which 
an individual is fundamentally able to engage in mental imagery. Indeed, neuro-imaging has 
highlighted a number of neural correlates with mental imagery ability (Cui, Jeter, Yang, 
Montague, & Eagleman, 2007). Furthermore, psychometric measures have been developed 
which have demonstrated their ability to measure various aspects of imagery such as 
vividness (VVIQ: Marks, 1973) and tendency (SUIS: Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). 
In order to position CBM-I training to fully utilise the preferential link mental imagery holds 
with emotion, it is vital that individual differences in mental imagery are comprehended. 
Indeed, the extent to which an individual engages in mental imagery in everyday life has been 
highlighted as a factor in the successful induction of an interpretation bias (Steel et al., 2010). 
Further work is needed to replicate the observation that the tendency for an individual to 
engage in mental imagery makes them increasingly amenable to CBM-I training paradigms. 
With this in mind, it is important for future research to consider whether an individual’s 
ability or tendency to engage in mental imagery can be enhanced.  
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1.4. Rationale 
 Research has successfully demonstrated the ability for CBM-I training paradigms to 
successfully induce interpretive biases in both analogue and clinical samples (e.g., Blackwell 
& Holmes, 2010; Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Such is the promise of CBM-I training 
paradigms in impacting upon negative affect through the modification of negative 
interpretation biases, research has sought to investigate the potential clinical utility of such 
training programmes. To date, this increasing focus on clinical samples has assessed the 
effectiveness of CBM-I training with samples demonstrating clinical levels of social anxiety 
(Turner et al., 2011), generalised anxiety (Hayes et al., 2010) and depression (Blackwell & 
Holmes, 2010). To date, there have been no clinical studies specifically assessing the clinical 
effectiveness of CBM-I training in those presenting with clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology. This section will identify and discuss the theoretical underpinnings which 
may highlight panic symptomatology as a presentation which may be particularly amenable 
to CBM-I training.  
1.4.1. Interpretive biases and panic disorder 
The Cognitive Model of Panic Disorder (Clark, 1986) posits that the catastrophic 
misinterpretation of bodily sensations elicit and increase sympathetic arousal, which is then 
interpreted by an individual as further evidence of impending catastrophe, with this feedback 
loop resulting in a panic attack. When considering such interpretive biases in the treatment of 
panic disorder, it is beneficial to consider the mediators of change in established efficacious 
interventions such as cognitive behaviour therapy. Hofmann et al. (2007) highlighted the 
implementation of cognitive challenging techniques, which focus on catastrophic cognitions 
relating to physical symptoms, as a central component to the mediation of treatment change 
in CBT. Consideration of such evidence, underlines the potential clinical benefits of targeting 
such cognitive biases in those with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. It is the aim of 
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the present study to assess whether CBM-I is able to successfully modify these cognitive 
biases. Despite the theoretical suitability for panic disorder and those with clinical levels of 
panic symptomatology to be a suitable target for CBM-I, the author is aware of no research 
exploring the potential clinical utility of CBM-I with these populations. It is important that 
the current clinical evidence base pertaining to the clinical utility of CBM-I is expanded to 
consider other anxiety disorders such as panic disorder (Beard, 2011). 
1.4.2. Anxiety sensitivity and panic disorder 
 Further support for the assertion that panic symptomatology represents a suitable 
target disorder for CBM-I training resides in the close link between panic disorder and 
anxiety sensitivity. Whilst there are no studies to date exploring CBM-I with panic disorder, 
completion of a single-session CBM-I training task has demonstrated its ability to modify 
interpretive biases in an analogue sample with high levels of anxiety sensitivity (Steinman & 
Teachman, 2010). Changes in anxiety sensitivity have been found to wholly mediate changes 
in panic related impairment following cognitive behaviour therapy (Smits et al., 2004). 
Additionally, completion of CBT for panic disorder, which has been deemed clinically 
successful, has resulted in lower levels of anxiety sensitivity (Otto & Reilly-Harrington, 
1999). The constructs of anxiety sensitivity and panic disorder are clearly closely related and 
share a degree of overlap in the importance they place on fear of somatic sensations. The 
observation that CBM-I training can reduce scores of anxiety sensitivity after only a single 
session, further substantiates the rationale underpinning the application of CBM-I to a sample 
of participants demonstrating clinical levels of panic symptomatology. In continuing to 
demonstrate the clinical utility of CBM-I across anxiety disorders, the present study will 
explore the impact that completion of CBM-I training has on levels of anxiety sensitivity. 
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1.4.3. CBM-I and contemporary healthcare provision 
 Currently, CBT is recommended as the intervention of choice in the United Kingdom 
with access to psychological therapy gained through a stepped care approach (NICE, 2011). 
Furthermore, the treatment option of choice should be made accessible to the patient 
‘promptly’, a point which can present a number of challenges. As a means of addressing this 
requirement to provide evidence based support in a timely manner, computerised CBT has 
been recommended in the treatment of depression and panic disorder (NICE, 2006). Indeed, 
computerised CBT has been described as an ‘efficient treatment strategy’, although low 
adherence rates have been identified (Gerhards et al., 2010). Building upon the success of 
computerised CBT programmes, CBM-I is required to demonstrate clinical utility in 
naturalistic settings with clinical samples if it is to be considered complimentary to current 
guidance. As such, the present study aims to assess the clinical effectiveness of an internet 
accessed multi-session CBM-I training paradigm with individuals experiencing clinical levels 
of panic symptomatology.  
1.5. Aims of the Present Study 
 The present study aims to assess the effects of a CBM-I training paradigm with a 
sample of individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. As a means of addressing 
the need for CBM-I research to take place with a real-world clinical setting, the present study 
will utilise an internet delivered CBM-I training programme enabling participant to access the 
paradigm in their own home. The methodology adopted by the presented study draws upon 
previous CBM-I literature in order to fully exploit the potential benefits of the CBM-I 
training paradigm.  
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1.6. Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one: A seven-session internet administered CBM-I training programme 
will reduce levels of panic in individuals experiencing clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology, with these changes evidenced at follow up. 
Hypothesis two: Individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology will 
demonstrate an increased positive interpretation bias following a seven-session 
internet administered CBM-I training programme, with these changes evidenced at 
follow-up. 
Hypothesis three: Individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology will 
demonstrate a decrease in anxiety sensitivity following a seven-session internet 
administered CBM-I training programme, with these changes evidenced at follow-up. 
Hypothesis four: Individuals who are better able to vividly imagine the training 
scenarios will evidence the greatest decrease in scores across outcome measures.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
2.1. Chapter Introduction  
 This chapter outlines the methodology of the present study. It begins with a rationale 
of the study design alongside a description of the core features of a non-concurrent multiple 
baseline single-case series design. Next, a brief participant profile is presented and the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria are discussed. All screening and outcome measures adopted 
by the present study are then described and their psychometric properties considered. Finally, 
the procedure is described and the ethical considerations highlighted.  
2.2. Design 
 The present study employed a single-case research design with follow-up (Barlow & 
Hersen, 1984). Single-case design methodology has been identified as a means of expanding 
and complementing the yield of a traditional quantitative research perspective (Kazdin, 
2007). Additionally, single-case research design has been identified as being inimitably 
suited to appraising treatment effects with individual participants (Hayes, 1981; Kazdin, 
1978). With the present study in mind, such a methodology offers an opportunity for 
researchers to appraise the efficacy of potential interventions which may be considered in 
their infancy. This opportunity has been reflected in a renewed focus on the role that single-
case designs may play in the development and continued establishment of a scientific basis 
for psychological interventions (Kratochwill, 2007). With a specific focus on CBM-I, a 
number of studies have adopted a single-case design to evaluate the effectiveness of CBM-I 
paradigms across a variety of populations (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Turner et al., 
2011). 
A non-concurrent multiple-baseline across participants design (Barlow & Hersen, 
1984) was used by the present study (see Figure 2.1). A multiple-baseline research design has 
been suggested as an appropriate, and potentially advantageous, methodology for evaluating 
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population based research (Hawkins, Sanson-Fisher, Shakeshaft, D’Este & Green, 2007). The 
basis for this assertion relates to the requirement of a smaller number of participants, in which 
each participant acts as their own control, (Hawkins et al., 2007). Indeed, as the design does 
not require a return to baseline level it can be considered ethically sound (Barlow, Nock & 
Herson, 2009). The inclusion of multiple baselines, allows for an appreciation of the specific 
effect of an intervention, through the introduction of participants to baselines of varying 
length (Kazdin, 2010). That is, if baseline changes are observed subsequent to the 
introduction of the CBM-I task, it is plausible to attribute this change to the completion of the 
CBM-I task, as opposed to any unaccounted variables (Kazdin & Kopel, 1975). Within the 
present study, participants were randomly allocated to varying baseline periods of seven, nine 
or eleven days.   
Figure 2.1. Phases of multiple baseline design 
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Watson and Workman (1981) summarised that the combination of varying baseline 
conditions and random assignment to groups bolsters the potential of a research study to 
demonstrate experimental control. Adherence to this suggested practice aids levels of 
experimental control and minimises threats to internal validity (Carr, 2005). 
 This research design offered a plausible and established means of contributing to the 
development of psychological interventions (Kratochwill & Levin, 2010). The non-
concurrent multiple-baseline design provided a framework in which the present study could 
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be conducted in an applied setting (Christ, 2007). Furthermore, Salkovskis (1995) discussed 
the importance of single-case series designs in contributing to the development of 
psychological interventions. In his ‘hourglass’ model, Salkovskis highlighted that single-case 
research designs act as a precursor to larger scale research designs. 
2.2.1. Randomisation 
 As highlighted by Watson and Workman (1981), an important consideration when 
aiming to bolster the experimental control of a study adopting a single-case research design 
methodology is the randomisation of participants to baseline conditions. Bolstering 
experimental control is suggested as a prudent step when employing a non-concurrent design 
(Christ, 2007). As a means of randomising participants to baseline conditions a random 
number generator was used. This random number generator was accessed online at 
www.random.org. The initial digits of the number provided by the website were used to 
determine the baseline condition of each participant using the following sequence; 1-3 to 
seven day baseline, 4-6 to nine day baseline, and 7-9 to eleven day baseline. In the event that 
all three baselines were allocated the initial digit was overlooked and the next digit used. 
2.3. Participants 
 Participants were recruited from two main sources. Firstly, a number of participants 
were recruited from Primary and Secondary Mental Health Services situated within 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Foundation Trust (CPFT). In total seven NHS sites were 
made available for recruitment. Secondly, participants were recruited from the University of 
East Anglia after responding to an email advertisement. 
2.3.1. Inclusion criteria 
 The inclusion criteria required participants to be at least 18 years of age at point of 
referral into the study. Participants needed to demonstrate clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology as determined by the Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS; Shear, Brown, 
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et al., 1997). This was evidenced by obtaining a score of 8 or greater on the PDSS (Shear et 
al., 2001). Due to the high prevalence rates of panic symptomatology with other mental 
disorders, it was not a requirement of the present that panic was considered their primary 
diagnosis. Relating to this point, it has been suggested that people with uncomplicated panic 
disorder represents fewer than a third of the people who demonstrate clinical levels of panic 
disorder (Johnson et al., 1990).  Participants were required to be considered stable on 
psychotropic medication (if prescribed) at study inception. Due to the nature of the CBM-I 
training tasks, participants were required to be proficient in reading and comprehending 
English, able to use a computer and access the internet to an appropriate level.   
2.3.2 Exclusion criteria 
 Individuals who demonstrated severe clinical levels of depression by scoring above 
19 on the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ 9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) were 
excluded from the study. Individuals who exhibited suicidal ideation at study inception were 
also excluded. Likewise, individuals who were considered to abuse substances were excluded 
from the present study due to the potential interaction this behaviour may have with the 
presentation of panic disorder (Cowley, 1992; Cox, Norton, Swinson, & Endler, 1990). 
Interventions such as cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) have been shown to reduce 
interpretative bias in individuals with panic disorder (Westling & Ost, 1995). Consequently, 
whilst potentially seeking support, those receiving psychological intervention at the 
commencement of the study were excluded due to the potential for this to act as a 
confounding variable. Other exclusion criteria consisted of individuals with a known learning 
disability, traumatic brain injury and psychotic illness.  
 2.3.3. Recruitment of participants 
 The present study had initially hoped to recruit nine participants from Improving 
Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) teams located within CPFT. Previous studies 
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exploring the efficacy of CBM-I using single-case series methodology have utilised sample 
sizes between six and nine participants (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Turner et al., 2011). 
At the time of recruitment, mental health services within CPFT were subject to a major 
redesign with many members of staff uncertain about the future of their jobs. Given the 
context against which recruitment was set, the author made attempts to make the 
identification and referral of potential participants as least demanding as possible for 
clinicians. Throughout recruitment clinicians were asked to identify individuals they believed 
may have panic symptomatology at initial assessment or if an individual was being ‘stepped 
up’ to receive a higher intensity psychological intervention.  The process of recruitment, as 
accepted by the ethical committee (see Appendix A), required referring clinicians to gain 
verbal consent from a potential participant to be contacted by the researcher. The researcher 
would then complete all screening measures in order to determine eligibility criteria had been 
met. Team meetings were attended with this referral process re-affirmed and channels of 
communication set-up. In total five IAPT services covering the whole of CPFT were utilised 
as recruitment sites. As recruitment progressed through its first two months a total of two 
potential participants were referred from across the five recruitment sites. In an attempt to 
boost recruitment, additional secondary mental health services were set up as recruitment 
sites. Despite this, recruitment continued to be problematic. Due to time constraints 
experienced by the researcher due to the present study forming part of a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology qualification, a change to the original ethical approval was sought. Subsequently, 
a substantial amendment (see Appendix B) was made in order to recruit from the staff and 
student population at the University of East Anglia. It should be emphasised that all 
participants recruited from the University of East Anglia met the same criteria as those 
referred from NHS services. Equally, all participants could be considered help-seeking as 
they were accessing support from their GP at the time of their participation.  
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2.3.4. Sample size 
 As a consequence of challenges with recruitment, six participants were recruited to 
the present study. In total sixteen individuals were identified as potential participants for the 
study. Of these sixteen, ten were identified through mental health services embedded within 
CPFT and six individuals responded to an email advertisement disseminated to students and 
members of staff at the University of East Anglia. Of these sixteen individuals, eight 
withdrew before written consent was obtained, and a further two individuals withdrew after 
completing the baseline phase. For a diagrammatic representation of the flow of participants 
through the study see Figure 2.2.  
Despite the challenges faced with recruitment (see Appendix C for a recruitment 
timeline), the recruitment of six participants was in line with previous studies exploring the 
efficacy of CBM-I through the use of a case series design (e.g., Turner et al., 2011).  A 
sample size of six participants has been highlighted as a sufficient sample size to adhere to 
the requirements of the design (Kazdin, 2010). Whilst not accessing support through a mental 
health service at the time of their participation in the present study, all participants recruited 
from the University of East Anglia were currently under the care of their GP for their ongoing 
difficulties with panic symptomatology. 
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Figure 2.2. Participant flow diagram 
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consequence of ongoing difficulties with anxiety rather than ADHD. He explained 
experiencing frequent panic attacks when leaving the family home. This had led to him 
becoming socially isolated having dropped out of college. His scores on the PDSS were 
consistent with a moderately ill clinical description. 
 2.3.6.2. Participant two 
 Participant two was a 30-year old male with a six year history of panic 
symptomatology. He was referred to an IAPT service after presenting to his GP with 
concerns his symptoms of panic were becoming more problematic. Participant two spoke of 
his particular concerns relating to his heart-rate and how this often triggers panic attacks. 
Recently, his symptoms of panic were resulting in him spending less time socialising with 
friends. His screening score on the PDSS indicated slight illness, although participant two 
noted his symptoms had been unusually minor during the preceding seven days. 
2.3.6.3. Participant three 
 Participant three was a 53-year old male with a five year history of panic attacks. He 
was recruited to the study after he responded to an email advertisement. He reported 
experiencing panic attacks across different contexts. Participant three reported a difficulty in 
tolerating feelings of faintness and a rapid heartbeat. Participant three reported that he was 
awaiting a referral to be made to his local psychology service, with his current difficulties 
managed primarily by his GP. His screening score on the PDSS suggested an individual that 
was markedly ill.  
 2.3.6.4. Participant four 
 Participant four was a 40-year old woman who was referred following an assessment 
with her local IAPT service. She noted that she has experienced symptoms of panic for a 
period of six years. She stated that she avoided various situations to manage her panic 
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symptoms and wanted to change this. Her screening score on the PDSS was consistent with a 
moderate presentation of panic disorder.  
2.3.6.5. Participant five 
 Participant five was a 27-year old woman who responded to an email advertisement. 
Although not currently on the caseload of her local psychological service, participant five 
manages her mood with psychotropic medication for which she is under the care of her GP. 
Participant five reported frequent panic attacks across various contexts over the past three 
years. She reported particular concerns that she will faint when experiencing a panic attack. 
Her screening score on the PDSS was consistent with a slightly ill profile of panic disorder. 
 2.3.6.6. Participant six 
 Participant six was a 39-year old man who self-referred to the study after responding 
to an email advertisement. Participant six highlighted that he was due to access privately 
funded person centred counselling in the coming weeks, and wished to pursue his 
participation in the present study prior to this. Participant six is under the care of his GP in 
relation to his ongoing psychological difficulties. He explained that he struggled to tolerate 
various bodily sensations, which would result in frequenting and distressing panic attacks. 
Participant six’s screening score on the PDSS suggested an individual that was markedly ill.   
2.4. Measures 
 Please see Table 2.1 for an outline of the measures adopted by the present study at the 
time points that these measures were administered. 
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Table 2.1. Measures used by Present Study with Time Points when Administered  
Measure Time point administered 
BSI Screening 
PHQ 9 Screening 
PDSS Screening, Pre-Baseline, Pre-Intervention,  Post-Intervention, 
Follow-up 
PDSS Daily Daily throughout baseline and intervention phases 
BBSIQ Pre-Baseline, Pre-Intervention,  Post-Intervention, Follow-up 
ASI Pre-Baseline, Pre-Intervention,  Post-Intervention, Follow-up 
 
2.4.1. Screening and eligibility measures 
The measures discussed below were used in order to determine the eligibility into the 
study.  
2.4.1.1. Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ 9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 
2001) 
The PHQ 9 (see Appendix D) was used as a means of assessing levels of depression 
and is a widely used measure both within primary care and within a research context 
(Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002). The PHQ 9 is a self-report questionnaire assessing depressive 
symptoms as defined by the DSM-IV over the previous two weeks. The PHQ 9 is the 
depressive sub-scale of the Patient Health Questionnaire (Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 
1999). It consists of nine items which are scored on a four point scale ranging from 0 to 3; not 
at all, several days, more than half the days and nearly every day.  
The PHQ 9 was administered mainly over the telephone, following consent being 
obtained by clinicians for the researcher to contact potential participants. An advantage of 
using the PHQ 9 in a research context centres on a completion time of approximately one 
minute (Kung et al., 2013).   
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 The PHQ 9 can be seen to serve two functions. Firstly, the PHQ 9 focuses on the 
screening of depression in a given population and has shown strong psychometric properties 
across a number of domains. For example, Cameron, Crawford, Lawton, & Reid (2008) 
reported high internal consistency for the PHQ 9 when administered to primary care patients, 
both at baseline and at the end of treatment (α .83 and α .92). Furthermore, the PHQ 9 
demonstrated superior ‘operating characteristics’ compared to the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and the Well Being Index (WHO, 1998a) when 
screening for major depression (Lowe et al., 2004). The PHQ 9 algorithm for major 
depression has indicated good sensitivity (73%-91%) and high specificity (89%-94%) when 
compared against a mental health professional (Spitzer et al., 1999).  Secondly, the PHQ 9 
enables clinicians and researchers to monitor change over time. The PHQ 9 has been shown 
to demonstrate high responsiveness to change in individuals being treated for depression 
(effect size 0.99) (Cameron et al., 2008).  
2.4.1.2. Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1993) 
The BSI (see Appendix E) was used as a screening tool to assess co-morbidity of 
psychiatric disorders and has been identified as an effectual screening tool for differentiating 
across psychiatric disorders (Derogatis, 1983). The BSI enables profiling on nine independent 
dimensions, somatisation, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, 
anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation and psychoticism (Schwannauer & 
Chetwynd, 2007). The measure takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
As previously stated, panic disorder is often characterised by its co-morbidity with 
other mental health disorders (Johnson et al., 1990). Therefore, it was appropriate that the 
nature of this co-morbidity between participants was understood and appreciated. The BSI is 
a shorter version of the widely used Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, Rickels 
& Rock, 1976). The BSI comprises of 53 items which are designed to assess severity of 
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psychological problem during the past week. The items are rated on a 5 point scale of distress 
(0-4), not at all, a little bit, moderately, quite a bit and extremely.  
Derogatis (1993) reported good levels of internal consistency from the original 
manual across the nine subscales (α = .71 to α = .85).These results have since been replicated 
by Schwannauer & Chetwynd (2007) who reported levels of internal consistency across a 
sample of ‘GP attenders’ and across a ‘clinical psychology’ sample. Within the ‘GP attenders 
sample’, levels of internal consistency were lowest for the ‘paranoid ideation’ dimension (α = 
.71) and highest for the dimensions of ‘obsessive compulsive’, ‘depression’, ‘anxiety’ and 
‘phobic anxiety’ (α = .87). Within the ‘clinical psychology sample’ level of internal 
consistency were lowest for the ‘paranoid ideation’ dimension (α = .81) and highest for the 
‘depression’ dimension (α = .91). 
Convergent validity for the BSI has been established through analysis of the 
correlations between the clinical scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; Dahlstrom, 1969), the Wiggins content scales of the MMPI (Wiggins, 1966), the 
Tyron Cluster Scores (Tyron, 1966) and the nine separate domains of the BSI. The SCL-90-R 
has demonstrated excellent convergent validity with the MMPI (Derogatis et al., 1976). 
Despite convergent validity being evidenced through significant correlations (r =0.30 to r = 
0.72), the BSI can be considered to lack specificity due to the number of correlations between 
its scales which are considered independent of one another (Nezu, Ronan, Meadows & 
McClure, 2000). Nevertheless, the BSI offers a useful and important insight into the clinical 
presentation of the participants (Lam, Michalak, & Swinson, 2005). 
2.4.1.3. Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS; Shear et al., 1997) 
 The PDSS (see Appendix F) is a seven-item scale designed to assess overall levels of 
severity of panic disorder symptoms, (Lam et al., 2005). Clinician-administered and self-
report versions of the PDSS are both widely used within research and clinical settings 
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(Wuyek, Antony, & McCabe, 2011). For the purpose of the present study, the use of the self-
report PDSS scale was adopted. This version has been highlighted as an appropriate scale to 
measure treatment progress and is widely used within IAPT services as an outcome measure 
(IAPT Data Handbook, 2011; Keough et al., 2012). The PDSS consists of seven items which 
are coded on a 5 point ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 4; none, mild, moderate, severe and 
extreme (Shear et al., 1997). A cut-off score of 8 has been identified as a suitable screen for 
diagnosis-level symptoms of panic disorder (Shear et al., 2001). More recently evidence-
based guidelines for interpreting scores have been published (Furukawa et al., 2009). The 
PDSS represents seven different indices, frequency of panic attacks, distress during panic 
attacks, panic-focused anticipatory anxiety, avoidance of agoraphobic situations, avoidance 
of panic-related physical sensations, and impairment in social and occupational functioning 
(Lam et al., 2005).  
The PDSS served two main purposes within the present study. Firstly, the PDSS was 
administered as a screening tool to identify potential participants who met the central 
inclusion criteria of clinical levels of panic symptomatology. Secondly, the PDSS served the 
function of being a primary outcome measure, enabling the researcher to measure change in 
panic symptomatology over time. Completion of the PDSS takes less than 5 minutes. 
 Houck, Spiegel, Shear, and Rucci (2002) reported excellent levels of internal 
consistency for the self report version of the PDSS (α = .917). This was comparable to levels 
of internal consistency reported for the clinician administered PDSS (α = .923). The self 
report version of the PDSS also demonstrated good test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.81), which 
was broadly comparable to the value obtained for the clinician administered PDSS (ICC = 
0.83).  
 Concurrent validity has been evidenced through significant correlations between 
items on the self report and clinician administered versions of the PDSS (Houck et al., 2002). 
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Each of the questions contained in the PDSS were found to correlate highly with one another 
( r ≥ .69), except for question five (interoceptive fear / avoidance) (r = .59). When 
considering the total scores obtained by each version of the PDSS, a high intra-class 
correlation coefficient (r = .81) suggests that the self report version of the PDSS is a reliable 
format which has applications in both clinical and research contexts (Houck et al., 2002). 
Differences were identified between the mean total score of the two versions, with 
participants completing the self report measure scoring 2 points less than the clinician 
administered version (Houck et al., 2002). However, a number of potential factors limit the 
extent to which one can assume that a different cut off point is warranted by the self report 
version of the PDSS. Houck et al. (2002) discussed the potential for interviewer over-rating 
and the difference in the time-frame of the two formats to impact on this observed outcome. 
With this is mind, the present study maintained the original cut off score of 8 (Shear et al., 
1997) when screening for clinical levels of panic. 
2.4.2. Outcome and daily measures 
 All outcome and daily measures adopted by the present study were self-reporting and 
administered in a paper format. Measures were required to be completed daily across the 
baseline and intervention stages of the present study. The individual application of each 
measure will be discussed below. 
2.4.2.1. Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS; Shear et al., 1997) 
 Full details for this measure are contained in section 2.4.1.3. As discussed, the PDSS 
rates overall panic symptomatology severity in individuals over a seven day period. Within 
the present study the PDSS was completed daily, offering a profile of panic symptomatology 
over a 24 hour period. Participants were instructed to answer the questions in relation to their 
experienced symptomatology over the previous day, rather than the previous week. The seven 
indices contained within the PDSS enabled a wider appreciation of the impact of the CBM-I 
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task across various domains of panic disorder. Although, the PDSS is not a validated as a 
daily measure, it was deemed suitable due to the construct overlap it maintains with a 
validated panic diary (De Beurs, Chambless & Golstein, 1997). 
2.4.2.2. Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 
1986) 
 The ASI (see Appendix G) was used in the current study as an outcome measure to 
assess levels of anxiety sensitivity in participants. Anxiety sensitivity has been described as 
maintaining a close relationship to the catastrophic misinterpretation of interoceptive stimuli 
as evidenced in panic disorder (Cox et al., 1995; McNally, 2002). Lam et al. (2005) noted 
that in excess of 100 peer-review articles have demonstrated a link between high anxiety 
sensitivity and panic disorder. The ASI is a 16-item self-report measure designed to assess an 
individual’s fear of anxiety-related symptoms centred on beliefs pertaining to their potential 
to bring about harmful consequences (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987). Items are rated on a 
scale ranging from 0 (very little) to 5 (very much), with a total score ranging from 0 to 64 
derived from the sum total of all items. The inclusion of the ASI in the present study was 
mainly exploratory in nature, given the links anxiety sensitivity maintains with panic 
disorder. Completion of the ASI takes fewer than 5 minutes. 
The ASI has been identified as a psychometrically sound instrument for measuring 
response to treatment in patients with panic disorder (Lam et al., 2005). Peterson & 
Heilbronner (1987) reported high levels of internal reliability (α = .88), whilst test-retest 
reliability ranging from .71 to .75 (Reiss et al., 1986) has been demonstrated. Factor analysis 
revealed a single factor structure, in which 13 of the 16 items had a loading of 0.4 or greater 
on the first factor (Reiss et al., 1986). Scale items are identified as interrelated to a ‘fairly 
high degree’ ensuring that the ASI reliably measures a coherent factor (Reiss et al., 1986).  
Furthermore, the ASI appears to offer an unmatched contribution to the prediction of fear-
 60 
 
related symptoms (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) and is considered a valuable measure in 
the present study.  
2.4.2.3. Brief Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire  
(BBSIQ; Clark et al., 1997) 
The BBSIQ (see Appendix H) was used to measure participant’s interpretation bias. 
The BBSIQ is a short measure of interpretation bias, which is based on the Body Sensations 
Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ; Clark et al., 1997). The BBSIQ consists of 14 items in 
which participants are presented with ambiguous scenarios. Half of the items contained in the 
BBSIQ relate to external threats, such as social situations, whilst the remaining items pertain 
to bodily sensations. Completion of the BBSIQ takes approximately 5 minutes. 
 Following the presentation of each ambiguous event, participants are asked ‘why?’, 
and are then required to record the first thing that comes to mind. After completing their 
written response participants are asked to rank three possible explanations to disambiguate 
the scenario. One explanation is always negative, whilst the other explanations are either 
positive or neutral (Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Once participants complete all open-ended 
responses and ranking for each item, they are asked to go back and rate the extent to which 
they would believe each of the three alternative explanations offered for each scenario (Clark 
et al., 1997). Belief was rated on a scale of 0 – 8, with 0 being representative of ‘not likely at 
all’ and 8 corresponding to ‘extremely likely to be true’. For the present study participants 
were required to complete only the ranking and belief rating panic related elements of the 
BBSIQ. This is in line with other research utilising the BBSIQ as an interpretation measure in 
CBM-I research (Steinman & Teachman, 2010).  
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An example of a bodily sensation item on the BBSIQ is: 
 
“You notice that your heart is pounding, you feel breathless, dizzy and unreal, why?” 
a. You have been overdoing it and are overtired    (neutral) 
b. Something you ate disagreed with you   (neutral) 
c. You are dangerously ill or going mad    (negative) 
 
 Clark et al. (1997) reported alpha coefficients for each of the scales contained within 
the BBSIQ. Satisfactory internal consistency was reported for panic body sensation rankings 
(α = .86) and panic body sensation belief ratings (α = .90). Concurrent validity was 
established through comparison with a number of other validated measures, namely the 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire (ACQ; Chambless, Caputo, Bright & Gallagher, 
1984) and the State subscale of the Speilberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970). Bodily sensations scores were found to correlate 
significantly (r = .49, p < .001) with those for the ACQ Physical Concern Factor, but not 
with those for the ACQ Social-Behavioural Consequences factor, or those for STAI State or 
Trait Anxiety subscales (Clark et al., 1997). Test-retest validity is rather variable, with 
ranking data demonstrating satisfactory reliability (.73 to .75), however more variance is 
observable for the belief rating with reliability ranging from poor to good (.48 - .81) (Clark et 
al., 1997). Sensitivity to change was evidenced by correlating changes in panic composite 
with changes in negative interpretation rankings (r = .33, p < .05) and belief (r = .35, p < 
.05). As can be evidenced, the BBSIQ demonstrates satisfactory psychometric properties. In 
addition to its satisfactory psychometric properties, the BBSIQ is considered a suitable 
measure of interpretation bias for the present study due to the close alignment it holds with 
the catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder (Clark et al., 1997).    
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  2.4.2.4. Visual Analogue Scales – Panic Disorder (VAS) 
 Visual analogue scales (see Appendix I) were used as a means of obtaining an 
efficient and repeatable measure of subjective levels of distress associated with a number of 
panic related symptoms. Visual analogue scales have been widely used within anxiety 
disorder focused research owing to their suitability for frequent and repeated use (Tiplady, 
Jackson, Maskrey & Swift, 1998). Typically visual analogue scales consist of a ten 
centimetre line anchored at either end with maximal and minimal extremes of the dimension 
being measured (McCormack, Horne & Sheather, 1988). The visual analogue scales used in 
the present study were presented in this way and developed in relation to the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria for panic disorder. Visual analogue scales were completed by participants 
daily throughout the baseline assessment and intervention phases of the study. The four visual 
analogue scales in the present study aimed to evaluate the distress experienced by participants 
in relation to their bodily sensations, feelings of unreality, feelings of losing control and a 
feeling that they are going to die. 
2.5. Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM-I) Training Materials 
2.5.1. Cognitive bias modification: interpretation (CBM-I) scenarios for panic 
disorder 
 The CBM-I training materials used adhere to the original text based format as used by 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), in which participants learned to attribute negative or 
positive interpretations to various ambiguous scenarios. The aim was to evaluate the efficacy 
of a CBM-I training programme to train participants towards a more positive or benign 
interpretation of ambiguous scenarios relating to panic disorder. A small proportion of the 
scenarios used were taken from a study exploring the modification of interpretation biases in 
anxiety sensitivity (Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Additional scenarios were produced in 
line with diagnostic criteria for panic disorder as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
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Manual 4
th
 Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 2000). All bodily sensations represented in the 
diagnostic criteria for panic disorder were equally represented in the additional scenarios. 
These additional scenarios adhered to the format as advocated by Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000). All additional scenarios were checked by the primary supervisor of the present study 
and a fellow researcher investigating the efficacy of a CBM-I programme with another 
anxiety disorder to ensure scenarios related to the DSM-IV criteria for panic disorder (APA, 
2000). Participants were required to complete 50 training tasks each day, over a seven day 
period.  These tasks were presented to participants in blocks of 10, with the option to take 
short break in between these blocks. The training tasks presented over the course of the 
intervention phase were all unique and were not repeated, in order to manage potential 
training biases. The CBM-I programme was accessed through a designated webpage, with 
each participant receiving a personal username and password. Additionally, guidance was 
built into the CBM-I training programme to support participants in navigating the training 
programme.  
Prior to the commencement of each days CBM-I training session, participants were 
required to complete an imagery exercise. During this exercise participants were required to 
explore an imaginary scenario, paying particular attention to the sensory elements of this 
picture. Participants are then required to provide a vividness rating of the image they formed 
of the imagery task. Additionally, participants were instructed to visualise themselves within 
each individual training scenario that they are presented with. The inclusion of imagery in 
this way is consistent with current studies exploring the efficacy of CBM-I paradigms (e.g. 
Blackwell & Holmes, 2010).  
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The following is an example of an imagery task taken from the present study: 
 
 Example Imagery Task 
Close your eyes and imagine that you have just cut a fresh, juicy lemon in half. 
 Now imagine lifting it to your noise and have a smell.  
What does it smell like? Now take a bite and suck the juice.  
What does it taste like? What feelings do you get in your body? 
  
Training scenarios were four lines in length, and were intended to remain emotionally 
ambiguous until the last word. Each scenario was disambiguated by the completion of the 
final word fragment. This resolution determined whether the scenario was valenced in a 
positive or benign direction. Participants completed the word fragment by typing the missing 
letter on their keyboard. Following this, a comprehension question that was designed to 
ensure that participants understood the associated scenario was administered. The following 
is an example of a training scenario taken from the scenarios used within the present study: 
 
Example scenario 
Whilst at a charity dinner you buy a number of raffle tickets to win 
a holiday of your choice. The speaker announces the raffle is set to 
begin. You check your tickets and suddenly start to sweat heavily. 
You are sweating as you are 
e x _ i t e d      (excited) 
Do you think sweating is dangerous? 
Yes (incorrect)   No (correct) 
Completion of the daily CBM-I session took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
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2.6. Ethical Considerations 
 Prior to contact being sought with any potential participants, ethical approval was 
granted by the proportionate review sub-committee of the NRES committee North-East – 
Newcastle and North Tyneside 2.  Approval for the present study was also gained from the 
CPFT research and development department (see Appendix J).  
2.6.1. Consent 
When a potential participant had been identified by a clinician embedded within an 
NHS service, the clinician provided an overview of the present study and a brief description 
of what taking part in the study would entail. Following on from this, clinicians sought verbal 
consent for the researcher to contact potential participants in order to conduct screening 
measures. This was clearly documented in the patient notes held by the referring service. The 
chief investigator then contacted potential participants over the telephone to complete various 
screening measures and to ensure inclusion criteria had been met. Verbal consent to contact 
potential participants was not required for individuals recruited from the University of East 
Anglia as these individuals made initial contact with the researcher. If inclusion criteria had 
been met, a patient information sheet was mailed to potential participants (see Appendix K) 
that contained a detailed account of the present study and a follow up appointment arranged. 
This appointment would take place no fewer than 72 hours following receipt of the patient 
information sheet. It was during this meeting that written consent would be sought, before 
initial outcome measures were completed by participants. Participants were informed that 
they could withdraw from the study at any time and that participation in the study would not 
impact on their care as usual. 
2.6.2. Confidentiality  
 Participants were informed that all personal data and information would remain 
confidential. Participants were informed as to the process and location of their data. Data 
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were anonymised and participants were assigned a ‘participant code’ to help maintain 
confidentiality.  Data were stored in secure locked cabinets, and will be stored for five years 
before being safely destroyed. All procedures regarding the confidentiality of information 
obtained by the present study were guided by the Data Protection Act 
(http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk) and British Psychological Society (BPS) guidelines 
(British Psychological Society, 2005). 
2.6.3. Impact of research 
 The application of CBM-I training programmes in both non-clinical (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000) and clinical (Turner et al., 2011) samples has demonstrated encouraging 
results whilst maintaining participant wellbeing. Consequently, it is not believed that any 
harm would come to participants taking part in the present study. In the improbable event that 
a participant became distressed during the training programme they were encouraged to take 
a break from the task in the first instance. Should distress continue, a referral would be made 
to the participants GP or to the service that referred them into the present study. Where 
possible the researcher negotiated with participants a set time where they would be available 
to be contacted should any difficulties arise during the completion of the daily training tasks. 
 Due to the varying baseline lengths required by the design adopted by the present 
study, participation in the study ranged from 21 to 25 days. This was carefully managed with 
the participants who were referred from NHS services to ensure that treatment as usual was 
not impacted. 
2.7. Procedure 
 Subsequent to ethical approval being granted, meetings were arranged with IAPT 
teams located within CPFT. The purpose of these meetings was to provide an overview and 
rationale of the present study and to consider recruitment protocol. As discussed, clinicians 
embedded within services identified potential participants, obtaining and documenting verbal 
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consent to be contacted by the researcher. Lines of communication were established to enable 
the passing of this information. Alongside this, an email advertising the study was included in 
the staff and student e-bulletin at the University of East Anglia (see Appendix L). 
 Potential participants who were identified by clinicians embedded within mental 
health services were verbally given an overview of what participation in the research would 
involve. Once consent to be contacted had been gained, the researcher contacted potential 
participants by telephone to complete screening measures and to ensure eligibility. The 
participant information sheet was forwarded to those meeting eligibility criteria and a face-to-
face meeting was arranged for a time no fewer than 72 hours following receipt of the 
information sheet. For potential participants who responded to an email advertisement, a 
participant information sheet was emailed and screening measures completed via email, prior 
to a face-to-face meeting being sought. 
During the initial face to face meeting the researcher sought to gain informed consent 
(see Appendix M) for the participation in the study. Once informed consent had been 
obtained, the researcher completed the participant details sheet with each participant. 
Participants were then randomly allocated to a baseline condition (7, 9 or 11 days). 
Participants prescribed psychotropic medication at study inception, were requested to inform 
the researcher of any changes to this during their participation in the study. During this initial 
meeting the researcher completed both the PDSS and the ASI with each participant. Paper 
copies of daily measures (VAS and PDSS) were given to participants, and email or text 
reminders set up if requested. The PDSS and VAS’s were completed daily throughout the 
baseline condition.  
Once participants completed the baseline length to which they were assigned, the 
researcher met with them again to complete the outcome measures once more. In addition to 
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the outcome measures at the beginning of the baseline phase, the researcher completed the 
BBSIQ with participants to obtain an initial measure of interpretation bias.  
 Participants were given a unique username and password and directed to a website 
that hosted the CBM-I training programme. The researcher met with participants at their 
home to guide them through their first training session consisting of 50 training scenarios. 
This was in order to familiarise them to the CBM-I training programme. During this 
socialisation process, time was dedicated to the completion of an imagery exercise and the 
rationale for the use of imagery reaffirmed. Participants were required to complete one 
training session per day for seven consecutive days. During this period, the daily measures 
were completed by participants. As in the baseline phase, reminders were arranged if 
requested by participants. Where possible, the researcher arranged times with each participant 
where they would be available to be contacted should the participant encounter any problems 
whilst completing the CBM-I training. It was explained that it would be preferable that 
participants would complete the CBM-I training in conjunction with the availability of the 
researcher to be contacted, although this was not always possible. Following the completion 
of the CBM-I training participants completed the outcome measures as adopted by the 
present study along with the BBSIQ.  
The researcher met with participants one week post completion of the intervention 
phase to complete final outcome measures. Alongside completion of these outcome measures 
a semi-structured interview was completed with participants, with the data obtained from this 
interview written as a separate service based research project. The purpose of this semi-
structured interview was to ascertain the views held by participants regarding their experience 
of accessing an internet administered CBM-I task. Once all participants had completed the 
present study, a prize draw was conducted and three participants awarded a £10 high street 
voucher. Clinicians who referred participants into the present study were informed that their 
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involvement was now complete. Participants were given the option of receiving a summary 
of findings of the study, with this information being forwarded upon completion of the study. 
Finally, an end of study report was sent to the relevant ethics committee and the NHS trust 
research and development department from which ethical approval for the present study was 
sought (see Appendix N for a receipt of acknowledgement). 
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1. Chapter Introduction 
 This chapter outlines the results and statistical analysis of the present study. In total 
data from six participants were collected and analysed in line with the aims of the present 
study. Initially through visual inspection, participant’s scores on the PDSS and VAS are 
analysed across all time points to identify responders and non-responders. This analysis is 
consistent with the criteria advocated by Kazdin (2010). Reliable and clinical change is 
reported on outcome measures at pre-intervention, post-intervention and follow-up. The 
effects of imagery on outcome are also reported. 
3.2. Visual Inspection of Data 
 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the CBM-I training programme, participant’s 
scores on the PDSS and VAS were graphed and visually inspected. Visual inspection draws 
upon the criteria suggested by Kazdin (2010). The aim of this visual inspection was to 
ascertain whether scores in the intervention phase were representative of a significant change 
comparative to the scores of a participant’s baseline phase (Barlow & Hersen, 1984). To 
facilitate this analysis, Kazdin (2010) nominates two principles, magnitude of change and rate 
of change. Magnitude of change looks to determine whether there is a change in mean scores 
on outcome measures across phases and if there are any changes in level evident. Changes in 
level look to observe any changes in scores when the intervention is introduced. With this is 
mind, the need for a stable baseline is apparent. Rate of change looks to determine whether a 
graphical representation of data evidences a change in trend or slope. This criteria is 
supplemented by latency of change which focuses on the time between the introduction of the 
intervention and a change in slope or trend. Each participant is deemed to be a responder or 
non-responder based on their scores on the PDSS as this was used as the primary outcome 
measure in the present study.  
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To ensure reliable inspection of the data, baseline stability was calculated for each 
participant’s daily outcome measures (see Appendix O) using Kendall’s tau (Kendall, 1970) 
analysis. Kendall’s tau correlations were calculated for participants scores on the PDSS and 
VAS’s with the number of days completed during the baseline phase of their participation. A 
non-significant result of Kendall’s tau suggests that there was no significant relationship 
between time and scores, therefore indicating a stable baseline suitable for visual analysis.  
 3.2.1. Visual inspection of data: participant one (Responder) 
Participant one was randomly assigned to the seven-day baseline phase. Kendall’s tau 
analysis indicated baseline instability on the PDSS (tau = .651, p = .046). Despite this, as 
scores increase during the baseline, indicating deterioration in mood, these data are 
interpretable. Additional Kendall’s tau analyses revealed baseline stability for the bodily 
VAS (tau = -.169, p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05), the control VAS (tau = 
.451, p .05) and the dying VAS (tau = -.117, p .05). Change in mean scores for the PDSS 
across phases is small with a baseline mean score of 13.4 decreasing to 12.4 during the 
intervention phase (see Figure 3.1). Potentially this small change in mean is accounted for by 
an increasing trend of scores during the baseline phase. A clear change in slope is evident 
from the second day of intervention on the PDSS scores which is maintained to follow-up. 
For each of the four VAS measures a change in level can be observed with the start of the 
intervention phase which paired with a decreasing trend (see Figure 3.2). Participant one is 
cautiously identified as a responder to the CBM-I training programme. 
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Figure 3.1. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 1 (Responder).  
  
Figure 3.2. VAS scores across time points for Participant 1 (Responder).  
3.2.2. Visual inspection of data: participant two (Non-responder) 
Participant two was randomly assigned to the seven-day baseline phase. Baseline 
stability was confirmed for the PDSS (tau = .109, p .05). Additional Kendall’s tau analyses 
revealed baseline stability for the bodily VAS (tau = -.117, p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = 
.394, p .05), the control VAS (tau = -.504, p .05) and the dying VAS (tau = .117, p .05).  
PDSS mean score across baseline and intervention phases is identical (see Figure 3.3). 
Interestingly, there appears to be a reduction in PDSS score following the second intervention 
session, with four subsequent scores under the mean of the baseline being recorded. 
However, this improvement was not maintained with an increasing slope indicating 
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deterioration evident during the intervention phase. As is the case for the PDSS, a negative 
change in trend is observable for VAS measures between the second and fifth CBM-I training 
session (see Figure 3.4). Following this there is a clear positive trend in scores indicating 
increased distress. Consequently, participant two is judged as being a non-responder.  
 
Figure 3.3. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 2 (Non-responder).  
 
Figure 3.4. VAS scores across time points for Participant 2 (Non-responder).    
3.2.3. Visual inspection of data: participant three (Responder) 
Participant three was randomly assigned to the nine-day baseline phase. Baseline 
stability was confirmed for the PDSS (tau = -.382, p .05). Additional Kendall’s tau analyses 
revealed baseline stability for the bodily VAS (tau = -.031, p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = 
.313, p .05), the control VAS (tau = -.382, p .05) and the dying VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05).  
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PDSS mean score decreased from 10.9 to 3.9 during the intervention phase. Additionally, 
there is a clear and pronounced change in level following the introduction of the intervention 
phase (see Figure 3.5). This change in level is accompanied by a negative trend during the 
intervention phase. A clear change in level can be observed for all VAS measures (see Figure 
3.6) indicating that participant three responded to the intervention. It should be noted that 
there was a noticeable increase in scores across all measures at intervention seven time point. 
Although VAS measures were not recorded post intervention, scores for the PDSS indicate a 
negative trend suggesting that improvement was maintained. Visual inspection of participant 
three’s data suggests that they are a responder to the CBM-I training programme. 
 
Figure 3.5. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 3 (Responder).  
 
Figure 3.6. VAS scores across time points for Participant 3 (Responder).   
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3.2.4. Visual inspection of data: participant four (Non-responder) 
Participant four was randomly assigned to the eleven-day baseline phase. Baseline 
stability was confirmed for the PDSS through Kendall’s tau analysis (tau = -.274, p .05). 
Additional Kendall’s tau analyses revealed baseline stability for the bodily VAS (tau = .250, 
p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = -.108, p .05), the control VAS (tau = .106, p .05) and the 
dying VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05). Participant four’s PDSS mean scores marginally decreased 
in the intervention phase, to 12 from 12.5 in the baseline phase (see Figure 3.7). The 
introduction of the intervention does not bring about a change in level of PDSS scores. There 
is little variability of scores during the intervention stage, with no significant trend apparent. 
No significant differences are noted in scores recorded post-intervention and at a one-week 
follow up. There is an increase in level following the introduction of the intervention for all 
VAS measures, which was paired with an initial negative trend which brought scores back in 
line with the baseline phase (see Figure 3.8). As no improvement is apparent participant four 
is identified as a non-responder. 
  
Figure 3.7. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 4 (Non-responder).  
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Figure 3.8. VAS scores across time points for Participant 4 (Non-responder).   
3.2.5. Visual inspection of data: participant five (Responder) 
 Participant five was randomly assigned to the nine-day baseline phase. Baseline 
stability was confirmed for the PDSS through Kendall’s tau analysis (tau = -.189, p .05). 
Additional Kendall’s tau analyses revealed baseline stability for the bodily VAS (tau = -.435, 
p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05), the control VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05) and the 
dying VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05). Participant five demonstrates a clear decrease in mean score 
on the PDSS, from 9 during the baseline phase to 5.1 during the intervention phase (see 
Figure 3.9). An immediate latency of change can be observed following the start of the 
intervention phase, and whilst this initial change is followed by a temporary increase in PDSS 
score at intervention two time point, there is an overall marked negative trend indicating 
improvement in mood. This improvement is maintained at one week follow-up. Participant 
five scored above zero on one VAS only. As with the PDSS there is an initial small decrease 
in level following the introduction of the intervention phase which is followed by a temporary 
increase in score (see Figure 3.10). Despite this, there is a clear decreasing trend for the 
relevant VAS indicating an improvement on that scale. Visual inspection indicates that 
participant five is a responder. 
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Figure 3.9. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 5 (Responder).  
 
Figure 3.10. VAS scores across time points for Participant 5 (Responder).   
3.2.6. Visual inspection of data: participant six (Responder) 
 Participant six was randomly assigned to the eleven-day baseline phase. Baseline 
stability for the PDSS was confirmed by Kendall’s tau analysis (tau = -0.458, p .05). 
Additional Kendall’s tau analyses revealed baseline stability for the bodily VAS (tau = -.449, 
p .05), the unreality VAS (tau = -.315, p .05), the control VAS (tau = -.330, p .05) and 
the dying VAS (tau = 1.00, p .05). It should be noted that for all daily measures there is a 
large amount of variation of scores during the baseline phase. Despite this variability, during 
the intervention phase there is a marked decrease in mean PDSS score compared to the 
baseline phase, with a reduction to 15 to 10.3 evident (see Figure 3.11).  Following the 
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introduction of the intervention phase there is no change in level which suggests no 
immediate effect of the CBM-I training. Despite this lack of immediate response, there is a 
clear negative trend from ‘intervention two’ time point indicating a reduction in levels of 
panic. This reduction is also maintained at one week follow-up. It is also notable that the 
variability that is apparent in the baseline phase is replaced by a relatively stable reduction in 
PDSS scores during the intervention phase. Unlike the PDSS, an immediate change in level 
can be seen for all relevant VAS measures (see Figure 3.12). This immediate change in level 
is paired with a stable and consistent negative slope indicating an improvement in symptoms. 
As with the PDSS, this stable and consistent slope is not reflective of a fluctuating baseline 
phase. Despite the variability of the baseline phase, participant 6 is considered a responder. 
 
Figure 3.11. PDSS scores across time points for Participant 6 (Responder).  
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Figure 3.12. VAS scores across time points for Participant 6 (Responder).   
3.3. Reliable and Clinically Significant Change 
 As a means of assessing whether observed differences between pre-and-post 
intervention scores were reflective of clinically significant and reliable change, Reliable 
Change Index (RCI; Jacobson & Truax, 1991) and Clinically Significant Change (CSC; 
Jacobson, Follette & Revenstorf, 1984) were calculated.  In line with the hypotheses of the 
present study, RCI were computed for the ASI, PDSS, as well as ranking and believability 
factors of the BBSIQ. CSC was calculated for the ASI and both the ranking and believability 
factors of the BBSIQ. In line with the methodology used by Blackwell and Holmes (2010), 
evidence-based clinical cut offs are used to determine CSC where available. With this in 
mind, clinical change was said to occurred on the PDSS if participants moved from one 
clinical category to another (e.g. moderately ill to slightly ill) in line with evidence based 
guidelines (Furukawa et al., 2009).  
  CSC aims to determine whether an individual’s level of functioning post-test is more 
typical of a non-clinical population rather than a pre-test clinical population (Evans, 
Margison & Barkham, 1998). That is to say, were the scores recorded on outcome measures 
at post-intervention and follow-up typical of an individual without clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology. Calculating CSC results in a cut-off point which an individual needs to 
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cross in order for clinically significant change to have occurred. The calculation of this cut-
off point depends on the availability of normative and clinical data for the outcome measures 
used. Depending on the availability of suitable norms, Jacobson et al., (1984), cite three 
criterions for calculating a CSC cut-off. Of these, criterion C has been cited as the most 
suitable when normative data are available on both clinical and non-clinical populations. As 
such, criterion C looks to assess whether an individual’s post-test score is statistically more 
likely to be in the non-clinical rather than the clinical population (Wise, 2004).  Due to the 
availability of normative data for clinical and non-clinical populations for the outcome 
measures adopted by the present study, criterion C was used to calculate CSC. The formula 
used to calculate criterion C is, [SD (normative data) x M (clinical data)] + [SD (clinical 
sample) x M (normative data)] / SD (normative data) + SD (clinical data).  
 The Jacobson-Truax methodology was used to calculate RCI (Jacobson & Truax, 
1991). This methodology calculates reliable change using the standard deviation of a matched 
sample and the reliability co-efficient of a given outcome measure. Calculating reliable 
change allows for an appreciation of whether any observed changes are statistically reliable 
(Wise, 2004). The formula to calculate RCI for each of the outcome measures was, 1.96 x 
SD1 x  x (1 - r).  
 When both CSC and RCI have both been calculated, Wise (2004) advocates the use of 
a classification system outlining the relationship each participant maintains with both CSC 
and RCI. The classification system as suggested by Wise (2004) identifies individuals who 
pass both CSC and RCI criteria as recovered, individuals who pass RCI criteria exclusively 
as improved, and individuals who do not pass RCI or CSC criteria as unchanged. Individuals, 
who achieved clinically significant change, but where this change was not deemed to be 
significantly reliable, are reported and discussed. These individuals were considered to have 
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achieved a score that was consistent with a non-clinical population despite the magnitude of 
this change not being statically reliable. 
 3.3.1. Reliable and clinical change on the PDSS 
Clinical change was said to occur on the PDSS if participants moved from one clinical 
category to another as set out by Furukawa et al. (2009). These evidence-based interpretation 
guidelines suggest a score ranging from 3-7 was consistent with borderline ill, 8-10 slightly 
ill, 11-15 moderately ill and 16 and above markedly ill (Furukawa et al., 2009). An RCI of 5 
was calculated using internal consistency data (α = .917) reported by Houck et al. (2002). 
Clinical change was evident in all except one participant (participant 4), indicating a shift 
from one clinical category to another (see Table 3.1). Of these five participants who achieved 
clinical significant change, only participant two did not maintain this at follow-up. Reliable 
change was observable for only participant six post-intervention, but interestingly 
participants one and five went on to achieve reliable change at follow-up indicating a 
developing effect from the intervention phase. Using the classification criteria suggested by 
Wise (2004), only participant six met criteria to be considered recovered at both post-
intervention and follow-up time points. Additionally, participants one and five met the 
criteria consistent with a recovered classification at follow-up.  
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Table 3.1. 
Participants who Achieved Reliable and Clinically Significant Change on the PDSS at Post 
CBM-I and at One Week Follow-up 
Participant Pre-
intervention 
PDSS score 
Post-
intervention 
PDSS score 
Follow-
up 
PDSS 
score 
Reliable 
change 
Post 
Clinical 
change 
Post 
Reliable 
change 
Follow  
Clinical 
change 
Follow  
1 15 10* 9 No Yes Yes Yes 
2 9 6 10 No Yes No No 
3 11 8* 7 No Yes No Yes 
4 13 12 11 No No No No 
5 10 6* 3 No Yes Yes Yes 
6 16 7* 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note. PDSS = Panic Disorder Severity Scale 
*Indicates participant was considered a responder to the CBM-I paradigm 
3.3.2. Reliable and clinical change on the ASI 
Standardised data taken from Stewart, Knize, and Pihl (1992) were used to generate a 
clinically significant change cut-off point of <23. Stewart et al. (1992) reported both the mean 
and standard deviation of individuals with panic disorder (M=30, SD=12.5) and a non-
clinical control group (M=18, SD=8.7). Internal reliability was taken from Peterson and 
Heilbronner (1987) who reported high levels of internal reliability for the ASI (α = .88) 
giving an RCI of 10. A total of two participants (participants three and six) achieved 
clinically significant change post-intervention, with this change maintained at follow up (see 
Table 3.2). For each of these participants clinically significant change was paired with 
reliable change at both post-intervention and follow-up time points, consistent with a 
recovered classification (Wise, 2004). Of the remaining participants, participant five 
demonstrated both reliable and clinically significant change at follow-up, highlighting an 
improvement of symptomatology as measured by the ASI from the post-intervention time-
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point. Mirroring this improvement from post-intervention to follow-up, participant one was 
considered to have made reliable change at follow-up despite not reaching clinically 
significant change. When an individual passes the RCI criteria, but does not pass the 
clinically significant cut-off score they are considered to have improved (Wise, 2004). Only 
participants two and four did not achieve clinical or reliable change at any time-point, 
although it should be noted that participant four scored below the clinically significant cut-off 
score at all time-points.  
Table 3.2. 
Participants who Achieved Reliable and Clinically Significant Change on the ASI at Post 
CBM-I and at One Week Follow-up 
Participant Pre-
intervention 
ASI score 
Post-
intervention 
ASI score 
Follow-
up ASI 
Score 
Reliable 
change 
Post 
Clinical 
change 
Post 
Reliable 
change 
Follow  
Clinical 
change 
Follow  
1 50 48* 35 No No Yes No 
2 34 34 37 No No No No 
3 31 10* 8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 20 21 19 No No No No 
5 33 29* 22 No No Yes Yes 
6 27 10* 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
*Indicates participant was considered a responder to the CBM-I paradigm  
3.3.3. Interpretation bias 
3.3.3.1. Reliable and clinical change on BBSIQ interpretation ranking task 
In order to calculate CSC and RCI for the ranking of panic related negative 
interpretations, standardised data were taken from the original paper examining the role of 
catastrophic misinterpretations in panic disorder (Clark et al., 1997). The authors reported 
both the mean and standard deviation of individuals with panic disorder (M=2.2, SD=0.5) 
and ‘non-patients’ (M=1.1, SD=0.2), alongside satisfactory levels of internal consistency (α = 
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.86). A CSC cut-off point of 1.41 and an RCI of 0.52 were calculated. Using these values, 
participants four and six did not score above the clinically significant cut-off point off point 
at any time-point, potentially indicating a lack of panic related interpretation bias (see Table 
3.3). Of the remaining participants, only participant three achieved reliable and clinically 
significant change post-intervention and at follow-up time-points. Additionally, after 
demonstrating only reliable change post-intervention, participant five showed reliable and 
clinically significant change at follow-up. This is suggestive of a continuation in 
improvement following the completion of the intervention phase. Participants one and two 
achieved reliable change at post-intervention which was maintained at follow-up. Despite this 
reliable change, it was not sufficient to be clinically significant at either time point.  
Table 3.3. 
Participants who Achieved Reliable and Clinically Significant Change on the BBSIQ Ranking 
Task at Post CBM-I and at One Week Follow-up 
Participant Pre-
intervention 
ranking 
score 
Post-
intervention 
ranking 
score 
Follow-
up 
ranking 
score 
Reliable 
change 
Post 
CBM-I 
Clinical 
change 
Post 
CBM-I 
Reliable 
change 
Follow-
up 
Clinical 
change 
Follow-
up 
1 2.57 1.57* 1.42 Yes No Yes No 
2 2.43 1.71 1.86 Yes No Yes No 
3 1.71 1* 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 1 1 1.14 No No No No 
5 1.57 1.29* 1 No Yes Yes Yes 
6 1 1* 1 No No No No 
Note. BBSIQ = Brief Bodily Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire 
*Indicates participant was considered a responder to the CBM-I paradigm  
3.3.3.2. Reliable and clinical change on BBSIQ believability rating task  
As with the BBSIQ ranking task, standardised data were taken from Clark et al. 
(1997) in order to calculate RCI and CSC. The authors reported both the mean and standard 
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deviation of individuals with panic disorder (M=4.4, SD=1.6) and ‘non-patients’ (M=1.1, 
SD=0.7), alongside satisfactory levels of internal consistency (α = .90). Subsequent 
calculations generated a CSC cut-off point of 2.3 and an RCI of 1.4. Unfortunately, 
participant six incorrectly recorded their believability ratings for the BBSIQ and 
consequently their data has been omitted from the current analysis. Of the remaining 
participants, only participant one achieved reliably significant change post-intervention and at 
follow-up (see Table 3.4). As with the ranking task, this change did not cross the cut-off to 
reach clinically significant change. Despite not showing clinically significant change post-
intervention, participant three achieved this at follow-up indicating a continued improvement 
to pass this threshold. Participant three did not achieve reliable change at either time-point. 
Participants four and five did not score above the clinically significant cut-off for the 
believability task at any time-point, and despite participant five showing a reduction in scores 
in line with a number of other participants this was not sufficient to be reliably significant.   
Table 3.4. 
Participants who Achieved Reliable and Clinically Significant Change on the BBSIQ 
Believability Task at Post CBM-I and at One Week Follow-up 
Participant Pre-
intervention 
believe. 
Score 
Post-
intervention 
believe. 
Score 
Follow-
up 
believe. 
Score 
Reliable 
change 
Post 
CBM-I 
Clinical 
change 
Post 
CBM-I 
Reliable 
change 
Follow-
up 
Clinical 
change 
Follow-
up 
1 6.00 4.14* 2.85 Yes No Yes No 
2 5.86 3.71 3.86 Yes No Yes No 
3 3.14 2.43* 2 No No No Yes 
4 1.29 1.57 1.86 No No No No 
5 1.43 1* 0.14 No No No No 
Note. BBSIQ = Brief Bodily Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire 
*Indicates participant was considered a responder to the CBM-I paradigm  
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3.5. Statistical Analyses and Effect Sizes 
 In keeping with previous CBM-I research that has adopted a single-case series design 
methodology (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010) sample means for outcome measures were 
calculated at pre-intervention, post-intervention and follow-up (see Table 3.5). In order to 
investigate change over time, and in keeping with the hypotheses of the present study, related 
samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests (Wilcoxon, 1945) were carried out (see Appendix P). 
Subsequently, Cohen’s (1992) r effect sizes were computed as a means of assessing the 
magnitude of change of completing the CBM-I training task at post-intervention and at 
follow-up. Effect sizes were categorised according to the criteria advocated by Field (2009). 
 A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a significant difference for the PDSS between 
pre-intervention and post-intervention (z = -2.21, p = .014, one-tailed). Subsequent analysis 
revealed this difference to reflect a large effect size (r = -0.64.). A significance difference was 
also found for the PDSS between pre-intervention and follow-up (z = -1.99, p = .023, one-
tailed). Again, subsequent analysis revealed this difference to reflect a large effect size (r = -
0.57). A significant difference between pre-intervention and post-intervention was found for 
the ASI (z = -1.75, p = .04, one-tailed) with a large effect size (r = -0.51). This significant 
difference was mirrored between ASI scores between pre-intervention and follow-up (z = -
1.78, p = .038, one-tailed). Subsequent analysis revealed a large effect size (r = -0.51). 
Significant reductions were observed between pre-intervention and post-intervention for the 
ranking task of the BBSIQ (z = -1.83, p = .034, one-tailed) with a large effect size (r = -0.53). 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test also revealed a significant differences on the ranking task of the 
BBSIQ between pre-intervention and follow-up time points (z = -1.75, p = .04, one-tailed). A 
Cohen’s effect size was calculated which revealed a large effect size (r = -0.51).  As with the 
BBSIQ ranking task, significant differences were found both the BBSIQ believability task 
between pre-intervention and post-intervention (z = -1.75, p = .04, one-tailed), and between 
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pre-intervention and follow-up (z = -1.75, p = .04, one-tailed). Large effect sizes were 
revealed at post intervention (r = -0.55) and at follow-up (r = -0.55).   
Table 3.5.  
Mean Outcome Scores at Pre-and-Post Intervention and Follow-up 
Measure Pre-intervention Post-intervention Follow-up 
PDSS    
M 12.33 8.17 7.5 
SD 2.8 2.4 3.08 
ASI    
M 32.5 25.33 21 
SD 9.97 14.77 13.28 
BBSIQ Ranking    
M 1.71 1.26 1.24 
SD 0.68 0.32 0.35 
BBSIQ Believability    
M 3.54 2.57 2.14 
SD 2.3 1.35 1.38 
 Note. PDSS = Panic Disorder Severity Scale; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index;  
BBSIQ = Brief Bodily Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire 
3.5. Impact of Imagery  
During the intervention phase of the present study, participants were required to rate 
the vividness of the image they have created of various training scenarios. Participants rated 
the vividness of five scenarios during each day of CBM-I training. Mean vividness ratings 
were calculated for each participant (see Table 3.6.) and Spearman correlations computed on 
observed score differences on the PDSS and ASI at both post-intervention and at follow-up 
(see Appendix Q). The calculations revealed no significant correlations on the PDSS between 
pre-intervention and post-intervention (rs = -.116, p = .413) or between pre-intervention and 
follow-up (rs = -.486, p =.164). Likewise, no significant correlations were identified for the 
ASI between pre-intervention and post-intervention (rs = -.314, p = .272) or between pre-
intervention and follow-up (rs = -.486, p  = .164). This suggests that the ability to create a 
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vivid image of the scenarios presented in the CBM-I training does not influence reduction of 
symptoms as measured by the PDSS and ASI. 
Table 3.6. 
Mean Imagery Ratings for each Participant with changes in PDSS and ASI scores 
Participant Mean 
Imagery 
Rating 
Change in PDSS 
score post-
intervention 
Change in PDSS 
score at follow-
up 
Change in ASI 
score post-
intervention 
Change in 
ASI score at 
follow-up 
1* 7.06 -5.00 -6.00 -2.00 -15.00 
2 5.23 -3.00 +1.00 0 +3 
3* 7.80 -3.00 -4.00  -21.00 -23.00 
4 8.47 -1.00 -2.00 +1.00 -2.00 
5* 7.49 -4.00 -7.00 -4.00 -11.00 
6* 8.77 -9.00 -11.00 -17.00 -22.00 
*Indicates participant was considered a responder to the CBM-I paradigm  
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
4.1. Chapter Introduction  
This chapter reflects on the research questions set out by the present study, reviewing 
the extent to which the statistical analyses discussed in the previous chapter answer these 
research questions. The contribution of the present study to the existing scientific knowledge 
base is evaluated with reference made to the existing theoretical perspectives outlined in the 
introduction. The methodological strengths and weaknesses of the study are then considered. 
The results are then discussed in relation to the clinical implications they raise and future 
areas for research are suggested. 
4.2. Overview of the Study 
 4.2.1. Aims of the study 
 The present study sought to investigate the efficacy of a multi-session internet 
administered CBM-I task with individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. 
Despite the studies that have identified the role of misinterpretation of bodily sensations in 
the onset and maintenance of panic disorder (e.g., Clark et al., 1997; Richards et al., 2001; 
Schneider & Schulte, 2007), to the authors knowledge this is the first time that the efficacy of 
CBM-I has been investigated with individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. 
It was hypothesised that completion of the multi-session CBM-I task would result in lower 
levels of panic symptomatology and a reduction of catastrophic interpretation bias. In 
addition, anxiety sensitivity was investigated given the links that this construct is thought to 
maintain with panic symptomatology (Otto & Reilly-Harrington, 1999; Smits et al., 2004).     
 4.2.2. Summary of results 
 The findings of the present study will now be discussed in the context of the research 
hypotheses set out in section 1.6.  
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4.2.3. Research hypothesis 1: A seven-session internet administered CBM-I 
training programme will reduce levels of panic in individuals experiencing 
clinical levels of panic symptomatology, with these changes evidenced at follow 
up 
 Visual analysis of the PDSS data for each participant revealed that four of the six 
participants (participants 1, 3, 5 and 6) were considered to be responders to the CBM-I 
training paradigm. As such, this suggests that the CBM-I programme, as trialled by the 
present study, is successful in reducing levels of panic in some individuals with clinical levels 
of panic symptomatology. Promisingly, of the participants who were considered responders 
to the CBM-I programme, three participants (participant 1, 5 and 6) went on to achieve 
reliable and clinically significant change at the follow-up time point. Of these three 
participants, only one individual had achieved reliable and clinical change at post-
intervention. The remaining participant (participant 3) achieved clinical change at both post-
intervention and at follow-up although the magnitude of this change was not sufficient to be 
considered statistically reliable. Interestingly, despite the lack of reliable significance, the 
score achieved by participant three at follow up would have meant that they were excluded 
from the study on the basis of not meeting the clinical cut-off score of 8 on the PDSS.  
 Furthermore, Wilcoxon signed rank analyses revealed significant group reductions in 
PDSS scores between both pre-intervention and post intervention, as well as between pre-
intervention and follow-up. For each of the reductions a large effect size was calculated 
enabling the author to conclude that CBM-I training significantly reduced panic symptoms as 
measured by the PDSS. In doing so this is the first study to highlight the potential efficacy of 
a multi-session internet administered CBM-I programme in the reduction of panic 
symptomatology supporting the above hypothesis. 
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4.2.4. Research hypothesis 2: Individuals with clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology will demonstrate an increased positive interpretation bias 
following a seven-session internet administered CBM-I training programme, 
with these changes evidenced at follow-up 
 The interpretation bias measure used by the present study contained a ranking and 
believability measure of interpretation bias. The ranking task contained in the BBSIQ 
required participants to rank the order of explanations to a given description. Conversely, the 
believability task required participants to rate the extent to which they felt each explanation 
as believable. These will be discussed individually below with reference to second research 
hypothesis.  
 4.2.4.1. BBSIQ ranking task 
 Interestingly, only four of the six participants (participants 1, 2, 3 and 5) scored above 
the clinically significant cut off score of 1.41 on the BBSIQ ranking task at pre-intervention. 
Of these participants, all went on to demonstrate reliable change at follow-up supporting the 
suggestion that the CBM-I package adopted by the present study modified interpretive biases 
in some of the individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. Of the four 
participants who achieved reliable change at follow-up, two participants (participants 3 and 
5) demonstrated a clinically significant change. Interestingly, of the two participants that 
didn’t score above the clinically significant cut-off score pre-intervention, one participant 
(participant 6) was the only individual to achieve reliable and clinically significant change at 
both post-intervention and follow-up on the PDSS. Conversely, participant two did not 
evidence reliable change on the PDSS at any time point but did show reliable change at both 
time points on the BBSIQ ranking task. However, it should be noted that participant two did 
not achieve clinically significant change on the BBSIQ ranking task which may have 
unpinned a lack of change on the PDSS.  
 Supporting the above hypothesis, Wilcoxon signed rank analyses revealed significant 
group reductions in BBSIQ ranking scores between both pre-intervention and post 
intervention, as well as between pre-intervention and follow-up. For each of the reductions a 
 92 
 
large effect size was calculated enabling the author to conclude that CBM-I training 
significantly reduced panic related interpretations as measured by the BBSIQ ranking task.  
 4.2.4.2. BBSIQ believability task 
 Unfortunately, data are only available for five of the six participants on the BBSIQ 
believability task after participant six incorrectly recorded their believability ratings. 
Participant six only recorded believability ratings for one explanation for each description. 
Believability ratings are required for each explanation contained within the BBSIQ meaning 
that their data were not able to be included in the analysis. Of the remaining five participants, 
only three individuals (participants 1, 2 and 3) scored above the clinically significant cut-off 
score pre-intervention. Of these, only two (participants 1 and 2) demonstrated reliable change 
at post-intervention and at follow-up. Despite this, neither participant achieved clinically 
significant change. It should be noted however, that participants one and two achieved the 
highest scores on this task pre-intervention. Interestingly, as with the BBSIQ ranking task, 
participant two demonstrated reliable change post-intervention and at follow-up without any 
changes evidenced at either time point on the PDSS. Of the remaining participants, only 
participant three went onto achieve clinically significant change at the follow-up time point 
although the magnitude of this change was not sufficient to be considered significantly 
reliable. Based on the low scores recorded for participants four and five it was impossible to 
achieve significantly reliable change, although participant five showed a clear reduction in 
the anticipated direction that fell just short of significantly reliable change. However, for 
those individuals who scored above the clinically significant cut-off score pre-intervention 
there appears to be a reliable change evident.  
 In order to examine group effects, Wilcoxon signed rank analyses revealed a 
significant main effect of CBM-I on BBSIQ believability scores between pre-intervention 
and post-intervention, as well as between pre-intervention and follow-up. Further analyses 
revealed the magnitude of these changes to be consistent with a large effect size. This would 
suggest that completion of the CBM-I training significantly modified interpretation bias as 
measured by the BBSIQ believability task which is consistent with the research hypothesis. 
To the authors knowledge this is the first instance a CBM-I task has been able to modify 
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interpretation biases using this measure. Although not a primary aim of their research, 
Steinman and Teachman (2010) did not reveal any modification to biases using this measure 
following a single-session CBM-I task with individuals with high anxiety sensitivity.   
4.2.5. Research hypothesis 3: Individuals with clinical levels of panic 
symptomatology will demonstrate a decrease in anxiety sensitivity following a 
seven-session internet administered CBM-I training programme, with these 
changes evidenced at follow-up 
 Of the six participants used in the present study, only one individual (participant four) 
scored below the clinically significant cut-off score at pre-intervention. This would seem to 
suggest the expected overlap of anxiety sensitivity with the presence of clinical levels of 
panic symptomatology was observable in the sample recruited by the present study. 
Indicating that completion of the CBM-I task reduced levels of anxiety sensitivity, four of the 
five participants who met the clinically significant cut-off score for the ASI (participants 
1,3,5 and 6) achieved significantly reliable change at follow-up. Of these four participants, 
only participant one did not achieve clinically significant change at this time point. As with 
the PDSS, significantly reliable changes in scores were not initially evidenced at post-
intervention for a number of these participants (participants 1 and 5). 
 Offering further support to the role of CBM-I training in the reduction of anxiety 
sensitivity and supporting the above hypothesis, Wilcoxon signed rank analyses revealed a 
significant main effect of CBM-I on ASI scores between pre-intervention and post-
intervention, as well as between pre-intervention and follow-up. Further analyses revealed the 
magnitude of these changes to be consistent with a large effect size. The efficacy of the 
CBM-I training paradigm used in the present study in reducing levels of anxiety sensitivity 
mirrors those results of Steinman and Teachman (2010). However, unlike Steinman and 
Teachman, anxiety sensitivity was not the primary target of the CBM-I training task used in 
the present study. The scenarios used in the present study were based on the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria for panic attacks (APA, 2000), with the observed effects on anxiety 
sensitivity consistent with the evidence base associating this two clinical construct together 
(Smits et al., 2004). 
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4.2.6. Research hypothesis 4: Individuals who are better able to vividly imagine 
the training scenarios will evidence the greatest decrease in scores across 
outcome measures.  
Previous research has suggested that imagery maintains a positive relationship with 
improved outcomes associated with CBM-I training tasks (Holmes et al., 2009). That is to 
say, an individual’s ability to vividly imagine training scenarios will positively influence 
outcomes on the PDSS and the ASI, therefore enhancing the efficacy of the CBM-I paradigm. 
The results of the present study do not support the above hypothesis. Spearman correlations 
were calculated between mean imagery ratings and changes in PDSS and ASI scores from 
pre-intervention to post-intervention and from pre-intervention to follow-up. None of the 
performed correlations highlighted a significant relationship. Due to the small sample size 
and the lack of a non-imagery control condition further conclusions regarding the enhancing 
effect  of imagery on CBM-I outcomes cannot be made. 
4.3. Theoretical and Empirical Implications 
 The findings of the present study lend partial support to the catastrophic 
misinterpretation model of panic disorder (Clark, 1986). This model asserts that an 
interpretive bias focused on the catastrophic outcome of ambiguous bodily sensations 
underlies the onset and maintenance of panic disorder. Of the four participants who achieved 
significantly reliable change on the ranking task of the BBSIQ, three were deemed to have 
responded to the CBM-I training. Only participant two was not deemed to have responded to 
the intervention despite achieving a significantly reliable reduction in their interpretation bias 
as measured by the BBSIQ ranking task. Given the expected reduction in interpretation bias, 
it is surprising that participant two did not respond to the CBM-I training as this would be 
expected according to the catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder (Clark, 
1986). With this in mind, this lack of observed response is not consistent with the 
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catastrophic model of panic disorder (Clark, 1986). When looking to understand this 
unexpected observation, it may be the case that an awareness of the purpose of the study 
contributed to this finding. That is to say, being aware that the study aimed to positively 
modify the way individuals interpret bodily sensations impacted on the responses given on 
the BBSIQ. This potential influence was not reflected in changes on the other outcome 
measures. Indeed, insight in to the training contingency of CBM-I tasks has been identified as 
a factor in observed larger effects on interpretation bias measures within CBM-I research 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  
 As mentioned, four of the six participants who completed the present study achieved 
significantly reliable change on the BBSIQ ranking task. Of those four participants only two 
individuals (participants 1 and 2) demonstrated a significantly reliable change on 
interpretation bias when measured by the BBSIQ believability task. Despite this lack of 
reliable change for two participants (participant 3 and 5) both individuals achieved a 
reduction in negative bias as expected. Whilst not significantly reliable, participant three 
achieved clinically significant change at the follow-up time point. It would appear that 
completion of the CBM-I training programme enabled participants to more readily identify 
benign explanations in a ranking task, but the believability attributed to individual 
explanations was more robust. When attempting to better understand this outcome it is useful 
to consider the cognitive model of selective processing (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
According to this theoretical perspective, completion of CBM-I training facilitates an 
increase in positive cognitive responses via the positive evaluation system, with this process 
occurring at an early stage of cognitive processing (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). Through 
repeated practice, the positive evaluation system becomes dominant over the threat evaluation 
system consequently suppressing a negative interpretation bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998). The accessibility and dominance of positive evaluations seems to be closely aligned to 
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the BBSIQ ranking task in which individuals rank the likelihood of a given explanation 
coming to mind. The observation that change was not significantly mirrored for the BBSIQ 
believability could potentially be explained by this task being representative of a later 
conscious evaluative process. Indeed, it is this later level processing that is the target of 
cognitive restructuring techniques used in cognitive therapy for panic disorder (Clark et al., 
1994). The results of the present study tentatively suggest that it is the accessibility of 
positive cognitions at an automatic and reflexive level that is primarily influenced as a 
consequence of the CBM-I training. As such, this finding is consistent with the cognitive 
model of selective processing (Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998) and the assertion that CBM-I 
training impacts upon the reflexive and automatic processing of information. When relating 
this specifically to panic disorder, Clark et al., (1997) suggest the interpretation bias 
represented in their catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic disorder is reflexive in 
nature. Consequently, the findings of the present study lend support to this assertion. 
 When further reflecting on the catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic (Clark, 
1986),  it is important to consider the significance of anxiety sensitivity in this theoretical 
perspective (Taylor, 1994). Anxiety sensitivity can be defined as fear of anxiety related 
symptoms (Reiss, 1987). The vicious cycle outlined by Clark (1986) in the model of panic 
disorder is thought to be driven by the fear of anxiety related bodily sensations. That is to say 
these individuals are typified by elevated anxiety sensitivity (Taylor, 1994). The notion that 
the vicious cycle of panic is driven by anxiety sensitivity (Reiss, 1991) has clear implications 
when considered in the context of the present study. If the CBM-I training is successful in 
reducing levels of panic, then one would expect an observable reduction in levels of anxiety 
sensitivity.  
The findings of the present study generally support this theoretical viewpoint as all 
participants who achieved significantly reliable change on the PDSS also achieved 
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significantly reliable change on the ASI. Interestingly, only one participant (participant three) 
did not achieve significantly reliable change on both the ASI and the PDSS.  Despite 
achieving reliable change on the ASI, this participant did not achieve significantly reliable 
change on the PDSS. It should be noted however that based on their score at follow-up 
participant three would not have been included in the present study as a consequence of not 
meeting the clinical cut-off score of 8 on the PDSS. Overall, it would seem that the assertion 
that anxiety sensitivity is a key factor in the vicious cycle of panic (Clark, 1994) is supported 
by the results of the present study.  
To date, this is the second study to demonstrate the efficacy of a CBM-I training task 
in reducing anxiety sensitivity following the study of Steinman and Teachman (2010). Unlike 
the aforementioned research, the main aim of the present study was to reduce panic related 
symptomatology as measured by the PDSS. As such, the training scenarios that were 
constructed and used in the present study primarily related to the panic disorder diagnostic 
criteria as set out in the DSM-IV (APA, 2000). The training scenarios adopted by Steinman 
and Teachman were based on the items contained within the ASI as this related to the 
primary aim of their research. As mentioned, whilst able to evidence reductions in anxiety 
sensitivity, Steinman and Teachman did not observe a significant change in interpretation 
bias on the BBSIQ. A suggestion offered by the authors was the similarity of the training 
scenarios to the main outcome measure potentially impacting upon the generalisability of the 
training to different measures. The findings of the present research study identify that the 
panic orientated CBM-I training programme used was generalisable to a different, albeit 
related, measure of anxiety sensitivity. Whilst of interest, the finding of the present study is 
not unexpected given the evidence base that anxiety sensitivity and panic disorder share 
(McNally, 2002).  
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As previously discussed, there is a growing body of evidence which has highlighted 
the enhancing impact of mental imagery on the observed effects of CBM-I training tasks 
(Holmes et al., 2009). Within the present study mental imagery was investigated for both the 
PDSS and ASI at post-intervention and at follow-up time points. No positive significant 
correlations were found for either measure. Despite this lack of significant correlation it is 
important to note a number of factors which limit the theoretical relevance of these findings. 
Firstly, a significant proportion of the research studies exploring the role of imagery in  
CBM-I have employed variations on the CBM-I training paradigm which have included 
presenting information using an auditory platform to promote imagery (e.g. Blackwell & 
Holmes, 2010). Whilst the present study recorded the perceived ability of participants to 
imagine themselves in each scenario, the paradigm used was not optimised for imagery 
focused training. Secondly, given that this analysis fell outside of the single-case series 
design the theoretical impact of this finding is somewhat limited by the small sample size 
recruited by the study. Consequently, the subsequent power of the analysis to identify a 
significant correlation is compromised. As such theoretical conclusions regarding the role of 
imagery in CBM-I paradigms cannot be made with any confidence.  
4.4. Critique of the Study 
 
4.4.1. Strengths  
This is the first study to explore the efficacy of a CBM-I training package in those 
with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. As discussed, individuals experiencing clinical 
levels of panic symptomatology face significant challenges across various aspects of their 
lives, as well as being at an increased risk of suicide (Borden, 1994; Johnson et al., 1990; 
Weissman et al., 1989). With this point in mind, the potential development of future clinical 
interventions which are effective as well as being amenable to dissemination on a large scale 
is clearly important (Yiend et al., 2014). The finding of the present study that four out of the 
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six participants were classed as responders to the CBM-I package is clearly encouraging. 
Whilst not all of these participants achieved reliable or clinical change across all measures, 
the findings of the present study are suggestive of a potential clinical utility for panic 
orientated CBM-I. Indeed, when appreciating the proportion of individuals who demonstrated 
reliable and clinically significant change (three out of six), this is comparable with internet 
administered cognitive behavioural treatment packages for panic disorder (Klein, Richards & 
Austin, 2006). As such, the focus of the present study to develop the CBM-I evidence base 
with a previously untested population is considered to be a strength. 
Previous research exploring the efficacy of CBM-I packages have identified the 
exclusion of an interpretation measure at follow-up as a limiting factor in their methodologies 
(e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008; Steinman & Teachman, 2010). The omission of an interpretation 
bias measure at follow-up doesn’t allow for the durability of any observed effects to be 
evaluated. In administering the BBSIQ at one-week follow-up, the present study enables this 
analysis to take place. In order for the clinical potential of CBM-I to be developed and 
realised, it is important that changes consequent to CBM-I training are durable and evident at 
follow-up. Indeed, it may be beneficial for future studies to include longer follow-up time 
points to shed further light on the durability of the consequences of completing CBM-I tasks.   
 The utilisation of the internet to administer the CBM-I package investigated in the 
present study represents a clear and obvious strength of the study. To date a significant 
proportion of CBM-I research has been laboratory based (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2009, Murphy et 
al., 2007; Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Consequently, the ability to generalise these 
findings to more naturalistic settings is restricted. If CBM-I is to be considered an effective 
intervention for various psychological presentations, then there is a need for research to 
explore likely platforms that CBM-I programmes would adopt in real-world contexts 
(MacLeod et al, 2009). Indeed, there are a number of advantages of delivering therapeutic 
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interventions via the internet. Internet administered interventions can reduce waiting-lists, 
save travelling time, reduce stigma and conform to the daily schedules of individuals (Marks, 
Cavanagh & Gega, 2007). In administering the CBM-I task online, the present research study 
offers results which one can generalise to more naturalistic settings, This is something which 
is of importance when aiming to advance the body of research exploring CBM-I. 
Furthermore, researching the efficacy of CBM-I using a platform that is clearly advantageous 
to mental health services, given the current context of the NHS, helps to position CBM-I 
demonstrate its clinical utility. 
A further strength of the study relates to the general acceptability of the CBM-I 
programme reported by participants. Anecdotal feedback provided by participants rated the 
CBM-I training programme as simple and easy to use which was considered advantageous. 
Equally being able to access the CBM-I programme online allowed participants to fit their 
participation around their day to day schedules. Previous research has highlighted the 
potential for CBM-I paradigms to be considered arduous due to their repetitive nature (Beard, 
Weisberg, & Primack, 2012). Informal feedback received from participants relating to the 
present study suggested that this was not consistent with their experiences and as such this 
acceptability is considered to be a strength of the study. 
4.4.2. Limitations 
 
4.4.2.1. Methodological limitations 
 
Single-case series design methodology has long been advocated as a suitable 
approach to evaluate the efficacy of novel interventions at an early stage in their development 
(Kazdin, 2010). The suitability of this experimental approach in determining the potential 
clinical utility of CBM-I has been reflected in a number of studies adopting this methodology 
in their research (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Turner et al., 2011). Despite the suitability 
of a single-case series design methodology in this context, it should be noted that this 
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approach has been criticised due to extent to which results can be generalised to a wider 
population (Platt, 1992; Wilson, 2000). Whilst this has long been a concern with this 
methodology, advocates of single-case series design methodology have countered that this 
criticism is somewhat misguided in its theoretical foundations (Kratochwill & Levin, 2010). 
Indeed, Hayes, Barlow and Nelson-Gray (1999) highlighted single-case series designs as 
being embedded within a process of logical generalization whereby participant and 
experimental characteristics are appreciated against a backdrop of the wider applied setting. 
As such, this enables this methodology to be utilised as a pre-cursor to wider ranging 
controlled trials investigating the efficacy of novel interventions (Kratochwill & Levin, 
2010). This apparent misunderstanding is further expanded on by Flyvbjerg (1994) who 
explained that this criticism is representative of a poor understanding of case series research. 
Whilst single-case series design methodology clearly has a role to play in the advancing of 
psychological interventions, it is nevertheless important to interpret the results of the present 
study with caution. As previously discussed, challenges with recruitment during the present 
study resulted in a sample size of six individuals with the aim being for nine participants. 
This small sample size could be considered a potential limitation. Despite this smaller than 
desired sample size, it should be noted that a sample size of six is in keeping with other 
CBM-I research utilising a single-case series design methodology (Turner et al., 2011). As 
such, the present study offers a useful evaluation of the efficacy of a CBM-I training program 
suggesting that further larger scale trials are warranted.  
A limitation of the present study was that a mechanism to measure compliance was 
not included. Other research studies exploring the efficacy of CBM-I paradigms have used 
the number of correct responses given to comprehension questions as a means of measuring 
compliance and adherence to the CBM-I package (Bowler et al., 2012). Should an individual 
fall within two standard deviations of the sample mean then they were considered to have 
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been compliant in the CBM-I training (Bowler et al., 2012). As compliance could not be 
gauged, the extent to which the results are interpreted with confidence is somewhat 
measured. Specifically, it may be the case that those individuals who were classed as non-
responders were not compliant in the intervention phase of the present study. Future studies 
should look to include a measure of compliance especially if CBM-I training programmes are 
accessed outside of controlled laboratory settings. 
4.4.2.2. Outcome measures 
The measures adopted by the present study are well validated and widely used 
measures both in clinical and research contexts (e.g., Casey et al., 2004, Klein et al., 2006, 
Steinman & Teachman, 2010). In order to meet the criteria of single-case series design, daily 
measures were required to ensure stability of symptoms over the baseline phase and to 
determine change following the introduction of CBM-I training (Kazdin, 2010). In order to 
measure panic symptomatology daily, participants were requested to complete a revised 
version of the PDSS, rating their symptoms over the past 24 hours as opposed to the 
preceding week. It should be noted that the PDSS is not designed to be a daily measure of 
panic related symptomatology. It was decided that, despite lacking validation as a daily 
measure, using the PDSS in this way offered a suitable daily measure of panic 
symptomatology as there was an overlap between the seven indices represented in the PDSS 
and the constructs measured by a validated daily panic diary (De Beurs, Chambless & 
Golstein, 1997). 
A further limitation of the present study, linked to daily measures, is the lack of a 
daily interpretation bias measure. In order for single-case research designs to provide 
evidence of causality between variables, a number of conditions need to be satisfied (Wilson, 
2000). Firstly, as a means of controlling against threats to internal validity, the baseline phase 
of a single-case series design methodology provides a control against which change is 
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quantified (Horner et al., 2005). This is achieved through evidencing stable symptomatology 
over a given period. Secondly, visual inspection of this data needs to be able to judge whether 
there are any changes in mean or level across phases and whether there are any changes in 
level or trend evident (Kazdin, 2010). Without a daily measure of interpretation bias, baseline 
stability cannot be assumed, nor can the effects of the introduction of the CBM-I programme 
be appreciated in relation to this via visual inspection. Consequently, it is not possible to infer 
the causality of interpretive biases in the reduction of panic symptomatology after completing 
CBM-I training. Future research should look to include a daily measure of interpretation bias 
to shed further light on the causality interpretive biases maintain with various psychological 
presentations. Despite this lack of daily interpretation bias measure, the BBSIQ was an 
adequate outcome measure of interpretation bias. Indeed the BBSIQ is a widely used measure 
of interpretation in panic related research (e.g., Steinman & Teachman, 2010). 
4.5. Clinical Implications 
For a number of reasons, the findings of the present study have potentially important 
clinical implications that warrant discussion. Firstly, it is important to consider the prevalence 
of panic disorder and the contexts in which this is reflected. The United Kingdom has been 
identified as having the highest prevalence of panic disorder in Europe (King et al., 2008). 
Additionally, it has been suggested that the prevalence of panic disorder is as high as 13% 
across primary care settings placing considerable pressures on these systems (Craske et al., 
2002).  It is clear that there is a need for evidence based effective interventions that can 
support these high levels of individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology. The 
results of the present study highlight the potential clinical efficacy of CBM-I, suggesting its 
potential as a clinical intervention. Research exploring the effectiveness of cognitive, 
behavioural and a combination of cognitive and behaviour treatment components in panic 
disorder indicated a clear superiority in treatment outcomes when cognitive therapy was 
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combined with behavioural exposure (Clark, 1999). The potential for CBM-I to be used 
alongside other treatment strategies in those with clinical levels of panic symptomatology is 
an interesting notion, and one which deserves future research. Indeed, the concept of CBM-I 
being adopted into clinical services is not implausible with the potential to form ‘therapeutic 
synergies’ with other treatment approaches a distinct possibility (MacLeod et al., 2009).  
Secondly, it would be implausible to consider the clinical implications of a task which 
may have a clinical utility without making reference to the current ethos evident within 
mental health services and the ways in which this ethos is reflected. Currently, there is a 
pressure on mental health services to reduce costs whilst maintaining effective and safe 
treatment packages. Alongside this, there has been an increasing appreciation regarding the 
need to make psychological interventions accessible, with this need forming a core ideal 
within IAPT services. These two drivers have contributed to the increase of internet 
administered cognitive behavioural treatment packages which involve minimal therapist 
contact (Barak, Hen, Boniel-Nissim & Shapira, 2008). Interventions which are less dependent 
on therapist contact are more easily accessible by people, often identifying internet 
administered treatment packages as useful waiting-list control strategies (Marks et al., 2007). 
In one study of an internet administered cognitive behavioural treatment package for panic 
disorder, 53% of participants did not meet diagnostic criteria for panic disorder post-
intervention (Klein et al., 2006). The results of the present study are comparable to this 
research as 50% of participants achieved reliable and clinically significant change. However, 
it is important for these results to be replicated using a larger sample.  
Despite the small sample size of the present study, it offers an important insight into 
the potential clinical utility of panic orientated CBM-I and in doing so justifies further 
research into this area. Additionally, the benefit of having an evidence based therapeutic 
intervention that can be widely disseminated is seen to take on further value when 
 105 
 
considering the suggestion that panic disorder is an risk factor in other psychological 
presentations such as depression and generalised anxiety (Skapinakis et al., 2011; Tull, 
Stipelman, Salters-Pedneault & Gratz, 2009).  
An interesting clinical implication raised by the present study resides in the 
relationship panic symptomatology maintains with anxiety sensitivity. Despite anxiety 
sensitivity not constituting a primary aim of the study, four of the six participants who 
completed the study achieved significantly reliable change on the ASI. The clinical relevance 
of this finding relates to the role that anxiety sensitivity is thought to hold as a risk factor in 
the onset of panic disorder (McNally, 2002; Plehn & Peterson, 2002). When further 
expanding this point, there is a large body of evidence highlighting the role of anxiety 
sensitivity in individuals with non-clinical levels of panic symptomatology (Cox et al., 1991; 
Donnell & McNally, 1990; Tull et al., 2009). As such, it has been suggested that non-clinical 
panickers are more likely to develop panic disorder than controls (Ehlers, 1995). For the basis 
of this discussion, non-clinical panickers are representative of individuals with infrequent 
panic attacks but who do not meet diagnostic criteria for panic disorder (Richards et al., 
2001). The results of the present study indicate that panic focused CBM-I may have a clinical 
benefit with those individuals who are considered non-clinical panickers. As mentioned, 
these individuals are at a heightened risk of developing panic disorder and subsequently 
engaging with services (Rob-Byrne et al., 1999). This distress is not only costly in terms of 
impacting the quality of life of the individual concerned but it is also results in a financial 
cost to the NHS. The idea that CBM-I could be utilised as a preventative intervention is a 
novel concept and one which would require further research.  
4.6. Suggestions for Future Research 
 As previously discussed, to the authors knowledge this is the first time that a CBM-I 
training task has been investigated with individuals with clinical levels of panic 
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symptomatology. Unfortunately, due to recruitment issues only six participants successfully 
completed their participation in the study. Whilst this is in keeping with other research 
exploring the efficacy of CBM-I training tasks (Turner et al., 2011), future research should 
look to replicate the results of the present study with a larger sample. Equally, whilst all the 
participants were help-seeking at the time of their participation in the study, whether that was 
from mental health services or via their GP, future research may benefit from recruiting from 
a more closely matched sample. In aiding this process, future research may wish to utilise a 
diagnostic interview such as the SCID in order to confirm diagnoses (SCID; First et al., 
2002).   
 There are a number of methodological improvements that would offer additional 
opportunities for discussion in future research. As mentioned, compliance to the CBM-I 
training was not measured in the present study. As the CBM-I package was accessed online, 
having an insight into the level of compliance would have enabled an added element of 
control from which to evaluate data. Equally, future research may benefit from the inclusion 
of a daily measure of interpretation bias as a means of inferring causality. As interpretation 
bias was only measured at pre-intervention, post-intervention and at follow-up, data 
collection did not conform to the criteria of single-case research design (Kazdin, 2010). 
When reflecting further on the measurement of interpretation bias in panic related CBM-I 
research, future studies should consider the inclusion of an open-ended interpretation task. 
This would position future research more in line with research exploring the role of 
catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations in panic disorder (Austin & Kiropoulos, 
2008; Richards et al., 2001), enabling more theoretical implications to be drawn.  
 Whilst the need to replicate the results of the present study are clear given the small 
sample size, there are a number of future directions for panic focused CBM-I which warrant 
discussion. Building on the prediction that the future of CBM-I resides in ‘therapeutic 
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synergies’ (MacLeod, 2009), future research may look to ascertain how this is best reflected 
with individuals with panic disorder. As discussed, pure cognitive restructuring has 
demonstrated efficacy in the reduction of panic symptomatology (Arntz et al., 1993; 
Salkovskis et al., 1991) However, superior reductions in panic symptomatology have been 
observed when cognitive restructuring was combined with exposure to feared situations 
(Clark, 1999; Margraf, Barlow, Clark & Telch, 1993). Given the finding of the present study 
that CBM-I can significantly alter the interpretation bias presented by individuals with 
clinical levels of panic, future research could investigate whether CBM-I combined with an 
element of guided exposure results in greater reductions in panic symptomatology than CBM-
I alone.  
When considering the role of future research in enhancing the effects of CBM-I 
training it is important to consider to idiosyncratic nature of panic disorder. Indeed, the highly 
individualised nature of panic disorder has been cited as a potential explanation under-
pinning the ambiguity discussed in research exploring the role of the catastrophic 
misinterpretation of bodily sensations in panic disorder (Schneider & Schulte, 2007). The 
CBM-I package adopted by the present study utilised the DSM-IV criteria for panic attack 
(APA, 2000) to develop the individual training scenarios. This diagnostic criteria requires 
that individuals demonstrate four or more bodily sensations from a possible thirteen. 
Consequently, it is feasible to suggest that a significant proportion of the training scenarios 
were not directly relevant for all participants. Literature exploring the reflexive nature of 
catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations has previously found that only when 
stimuli were idiosyncratically selected was a facilitated effect evident on a timed response 
task for participants with clinical levels of panic disorder comparable to controls (Schneider 
& Schulte, 2007). As such, future research should look to develop a way of screening 
relevant bodily sensations so that the proportion of training material is more relevant. 
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Potentially, a computer platform that allows a researcher to construct CBM-I packages by 
adding and removing blocks of relevant training stimuli would facilitate this research.    
The present study offers an exciting and novel option for future research centred on 
the suggestion that CBM-I for panic has the potential to not only reduce panic symptoms in 
individuals with clinical levels of panic symptomatology, but also the potential for the CBM-I 
package to serve a preventative function for those with non-clinical panic. This future area of 
research is underpinned by the findings of the present study in reducing levels of anxiety 
sensitivity alongside panic symptomatology. As mentioned anxiety sensitivity is a known risk 
factor in individuals with non-clinical panic (McNally, 2002). To the author’s knowledge, 
this would be the first CBM-I package that serves a dual function. When explaining this point 
further, panic orientated CBM-I may reduce panic symptoms in those with clinical levels of 
panic symptomatology, whilst also serving a preventative function for those at risk of 
developing panic disorder. This is an exciting area that could have a significant impact on the 
quality of life of many individuals, whilst at the same time representing a significant saving 
for mental health services. Looking to investigate the ability of the CBM-I package used by 
the present study to reduce levels of anxiety sensitivity in non-clinical panickers with an 
extended follow-up period would help to shed light on the ability of CBM-I to serve a 
preventative function.  
4.7. Conclusions 
 The results of the present study suggest that an online multi-session CBM-I package 
can reduce levels of panic and catastrophic misinterpretations in individuals with clinical 
levels of panic symptomatology. Interestingly, although not the primary focus of the training 
material contained within the CBM-I package, levels of anxiety sensitivity were also reduced 
post-CBM-I. Despite a growing evidence base detailing the enhancing impact of mental 
imagery of CBM-I procedures, imagery was not found to significantly improve outcomes on 
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the PDSS or the ASI. As only four of the six participants responded to the CBM-I training, 
the results of the present study lend partial support to the catastrophic misinterpretation 
model of panic disorder (Clark, 1986). Discussion of observed differences between 
interpretation bias as measured by the ranking and believability tasks support the cognitive 
model of selective processing (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). In doing so the reflexive 
nature of catastrophic cognitions (Clark et al., 1997) in those with clinical levels of panic is 
also supported. An interesting finding of the present study was the reduction of levels of 
anxiety sensitivity post CBM-I. This finding highlights a novel option for future research 
focused on the ability of CBM-I for panic to serve a preventative function for those with non-
clinical levels of panic. With this in mind, it would highlight the exciting potential of CBM-I 
for panic disorder to serve a dual therapeutic-preventative function in individuals with 
clinical and non-clinical levels of panic. 
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 22/03/2013 – Meeting with CPFT service lead, agreed to allow recruitment from 
IAPT services within CPFT 
 01/05/2013 – 01/08/13 – Ongoing difficulties with computer platform used to deliver 
CBM-I 
 10/05/2013 – Apply for NHS ethical approval (proportionate review) 
 21/05/2013 – Receive ethical approval from REC 
 22/05/2013 – Apply for ethical approval from CPFT research and development 
department 
 13/06/2013 – Receive approval from CPFT research and development department 
 10/09/2013 – Email sent out to IAPT team leaders to arrange to present research to 
team 
 11/09/2013 – Meeting arrange to present at joint Cambridge IAPT meeting on the 
29/10/2013 
 20/09/2013 – Email received back from Huntingdon IAPT team leader, appointment 
arranged to present to team on 04/10/2013 
 30/09/2013 – Email received back from Fenland IAPT team leader, appointment 
arrange to present to team on 14/10/2013 
 04/10/2013 – Huntingdon IAPT team meeting attended 
 14/10/13 – Fenland IAPT team meeting attended 
 29/10/2013 – Attended Cambridge IAPT meeting, presentation cut to five minutes 
due to full agenda 
 30/10/2013 – Email sent to service lead requesting information regarding study to be 
forwarded to various teams 
 30/10/2013 – Extension request submitted for thesis 
 10/11/2013 – Approached Adult ADHD service to discuss potential to use as a 
recruitment site 
 11/11/2013 – Minor amendment made to clarify role of secondary mental health 
teams in recruitment 
 11/11/2013 – Email send to Peterborough IAPT service lead to request to meet 
 15/11/2013 – Arranged appointment to present to Peterborough IAPT team on 
29/11/2013 
 25/11/2013 – Email sent to speciality service lead to add ADHD team as recruitment 
site 
 25/11/2013 – Permission received to recruit from adult ADHD team 
 29/11/2013 – Attended Peterborough IAPT team meeting 
 17/12/2013 – Extension granted, new hand in date 06/05/2014 
 08/01/2014 – Email sent to IAPT lead requesting research kept in mind and email is 
forwarded to teams 
 10/02/2014 – NHS ethics committee contacted requesting clarification regarding 
potential amendment  
 13/02/2014 – Response received from ethics committee noting substantial amendment 
needed to recruit from UEA 
 03/03/2014 – Email sent to IAPT service lead requesting further meetings with 
Cambridge IAPT teams 
 06/03/2014 – Substantial amendment documentation submitted 
 10/03/2014 – Emails sent to Cambridge IAPT team leads 
 14/03/2014 – Second extension request submitted 
 18/03/2014 – Substantial amendment approval received
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 20/03/2014 – Arranged to attend Cambridge IAPT team meetings on the 01/04/2014 
and 02/04/2014 
 25/03/2014 – Research advertisement included in UEA staff and student e-Bulletin 
 01/04/2014 – Attended Cambridge North IAPT team meeting 
 02/04/2014 – Attended Cambridge South IAPT team meeting 
 10/04/2014 – Extension request granted, new hand in date 30/06/2014 
 27/05/2014 – Recruitment completed (6 participants) 
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PHQ-9 Patient Questionnaire 
Participant Identification Number: _________________________  Date: ________ 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been 
bothered by any of the following problems? Not at all 
Several 
days 
More 
than half 
the days 
Nearly 
every 
 day 
1 Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 1 2 3 
2 Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 0 1 2 3 
3 
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too 
much 
0 1 2 3 
4 Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 2 3 
5 Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 2 3 
6 
Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure 
or have let yourself or your family down 
0 1 2 3 
7 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the 
newspaper or watching television 
0 1 2 3 
8 
 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could 
have noticed?  Or the opposite — being so fidgety or 
restless that you have been moving around a lot 
more than usual 
 
0 1 2 3 
9 
Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of 
hurting yourself in some way 
0 1 2 3 
  
 
 
PHQ9 total score 
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Brief Symptom Inventory  
  
“Here I have a list of problems people sometimes have. As I read each one to you, I want you to 
tell me HOW MUCH THAT PROBLEM HAS DISTRESSED OR BOTHERED YOU DURING THE 
PAST 7 DAYS INCLUDING TODAY. These are the answers I want you to use. [Hand card and read 
answers.] Do you have any questions?”  
0 = Not at all  
1 = A little bit  
2 = Moderately  
3 = Quite a bit  
4 = Extremely  
R = Refused  
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
1. Nervousness or shakiness inside 0 1 2 3 4 R  
2. Faintness or dizziness 0 1 2 3 4 R  
3. The idea that someone else can control your thoughts 0 1 2 3 4 R  
4. Feeling others are to blame for most of your troubles 0 1 2 3 4 R  
5. Trouble remembering things 0 1 2 3 4 R  
6. Feeling easily annoyed or irritated 0 1 2 3 4 R  
7. Pains in the heart or chest 0 1 2 3 4 R  
8. Feeling afraid in open spaces 0 1 2 3 4 R  
9. Thoughts of ending your life 0 1 2 3 4 R  
 
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
10. Feeling that most people cannot be trusted 0 1 2 3 4 R  
11. Poor appetite 0 1 2 3 4 R  
12. Suddenly scared for no reason 0 1 2 3 4 R  
13. Temper outbursts that you could not control 0 1 2 3 4 R  
14. Feeling lonely even when you are with people 0 1 2 3 4 R  
15. Feeling blocked in getting things done 0 1 2 3 4 R  
16. Feeling lonely 0 1 2 3 4 R  
17. Feeling blue 0 1 2 3 4 R  
18. Feeling no interest in things 0 1 2 3 4 R  
  
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
19. Feeling fearful 0 1 2 3 4 R  
20. Your feelings being easily hurt 0 1 2 3 4 R  
21. Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you 0 1 2 3 4 R  
22. Feeling inferior to others 0 1 2 3 4 R  
23. Nausea or upset stomach 0 1 2 3 4 R  
24. Feeling that you are watched or talked about by others 0 1 2 3 4 R  
25. Trouble falling asleep 0 1 2 3 4 R  
26. Having to check and double check what you do 0 1 2 3 4 R  
27. Difficulty making decisions 0 1 2 3 4 R  
 
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
28. Feeling afraid to travel on buses, subways, or trains 0 1 2 3 4 R  
29. Trouble getting your breath 0 1 2 3 4 R  
30. Hot or cold spells 0 1 2 3 4 R  
31. Having to avoid certain things, places, or activities because they frighten you 0 1 2 3 4 R  
32. Your mind going blank 0 1 2 3 4 R  
33. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body 0 1 2 3 4 R  
34. The idea that you should be punished for your sins 0 1 2 3 4 R  
35. Feeling hopeless about the future 0 1 2 3 4 R  
36. Trouble concentrating 0 1 2 3 4 R  
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DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
37. Feeling weak in parts of your body 0 1 2 3 4 R  
38. Feeling tense or keyed up 0 1 2 3 4 R  
39. Thoughts of death or dying 0 1 2 3 4 R  
40. Having urges to beat, injure, or harm someone 0 1 2 3 4 R  
41. Having urges to break or smash things 0 1 2 3 4 R  
42. Feeling very self-conscious with others 0 1 2 3 4 R  
43. Feeling uneasy in crowds 0 1 2 3 4 R  
44. Never feeling close to another person 0 1 2 3 4 R  
45. Spells of terror or panic 0 1 2 3 4 R  
 
DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS, how much were you distressed by:  
46. Getting into frequent arguments 0 1 2 3 4 R  
47. Feeling nervous when you are left alone 0 1 2 3 4 R  
48. Others not giving you proper credit for your achievements 0 1 2 3 4 R  
49. Feeling so restless you couldn’t sit still 0 1 2 3 4 R  
50. Feelings of worthlessness 0 1 2 3 4 R  
51. Feeling that people will take advantage of you if you let them 0 1 2 3 4 R  
52. Feeling of guilt 0 1 2 3 4 R  
53. The idea that something is wrong with your mind 0 1 2 3 4 R 
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PDSS 
 
 
Participant Identification Number:     Date: 
 
 
Several of the following questions refer to panic attacks and limited symptom attacks. For this 
questionnaire we define a panic attack as a sudden rush of fear or discomfort accompanied by at 
least 4 of the symptoms listed below. In order to qualify as a sudden rush, the symptoms must peak 
within 10 minutes. Episodes like panic attacks but having fewer than 4 of the listed symptoms are 
called limited symptom attacks. Here are the symptoms to count: 
Rapid or pounding heartbeat Chest pain or discomfort Chills or hot flushes Sweating  
Nausea Fear of losing control or going crazy Trembling or shaking Dizziness or faintness 
Breathlessness Feelings of unreality Fear of dying Feeling of choking Numbness or tingling 
 
1. How many panic and limited symptoms attacks did you have during the week? 
0 No panic or limited symptom episodes 
1 Mild: no full panic attacks and no more than 1 limited symptom attack/day 
2 Moderate: 1 or 2 full panic attacks and/or multiple limited symptom attacks/day 
3 Severe: more than 2 full attacks but not more than 1/day on average 
4 Extreme: full panic attacks occurred more than once a day, more days than not 
 
2. If you had any panic attacks during the past week, how distressing (uncomfortable, frightening) 
were they while they were happening? (If you had more than one, give an average rating. If you didn’t 
have any panic attacks but did have limited symptom attacks, answer for the limited symptom 
attacks.) 
0 Not at all distressing, or no panic or limited symptom attacks during the past week 
1 Mildly distressing (not too intense) 
2 Moderately distressing (intense, but still manageable) 
3 Severely distressing (very intense) 
4 Extremely distressing (extreme distress during all attacks) 
 
3. During the past week, how much have you worried or felt anxious about when your next panic 
attack would occur or about fears related to the attacks (for example, that they could mean you have 
physical or mental health problems or could cause you social embarrassment)? 
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0 Not at all 
1 Occasionally or only mildly 
2 Frequently or moderately 
3 Very often or to a very disturbing degree 
4 Nearly constantly and to a disabling extent 
 
4. During the past week were there any places or situations (e.g., public transportation, movie 
theatres, crowds, bridges, tunnels, shopping malls, being alone) you avoided, or felt afraid of 
(uncomfortable in, wanted to avoid or leave), because of fear of having a panic attack? Are there any 
other situations that you would have avoided or been afraid of if they had come up during the week, 
for the same reason? If yes to either question, please rate your level of fear and avoidance this past 
week. 
0 None: No fear or avoidance 
1 Mild: Occasional fear and/or avoidance but I could usually confront or endure the situation. There 
was little or no modification of my lifestyle due to this. 
2 Moderate: Noticeable fear and/or avoidance but still manageable. I avoided some situations, but I 
could confront them with a companion. There was some modification of my lifestyle because of this, 
but my overall functioning was not impaired. 
3 Severe: extensive avoidance. Substantial modification of my lifestyle was required to accommodate 
the avoidance making it difficult to manage usual activities. 
4 Extreme: pervasive disabling fear and/or avoidance. Extensive modification in my lifestyle was 
required such that important tasks were not performed. 
 
5. During the past week, were there any activities (e.g., physical exertion, sexual relations, taking a 
hot shower or bath, drinking coffee, watching an exciting or scary movie) that you avoided, or felt 
afraid of (uncomfortable doing, wanted to avoid or stop), because they caused physical sensations 
like those you feel during panic attacks or that you were afraid might trigger a panic attack? Are there 
any other activities that you would have avoided or been afraid of if they had come up during the 
week for that reason? If yes to either question, please rate your level of fear and avoidance of those 
activities this past week. 
0 No fear or avoidance of situations or activities because of distressing physical sensations 
1 Mild: occasional fear and/or avoidance, but usually I could confront or endure with little distress 
activities that cause physical sensations. There was little modification of my lifestyle due to this. 
2 Moderate: noticeable avoidance but still manageable. There was definite, but limited, modification of 
my lifestyle such that my overall functioning was not impaired. 
3 Severe: extensive avoidance. There was substantial modification of my lifestyle or interference in 
my functioning. 
4 Extreme: pervasive and disabling avoidance. There was extensive modification in my lifestyle due to 
this such that important tasks or activities were not performed. 
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6. During the past week, how much did the above symptoms altogether (panic and limited symptom 
attacks, worry about attacks, and fear of situations and activities because of attacks) interfere with 
your ability to work or carry out your responsibilities at home? (If your work or home responsibilities 
were less than usual this past week, answer how you think you would have done if the responsibilities 
had been usual.) 
0 No interference with work or home responsibilities 
1 Slight interference with work or home responsibilities, but I could do nearly everything I could if I 
didn’t have these problems. 
2 Significant interference with work or home responsibilities, but I still could manage to do the things I 
needed to do. 
3 Substantial impairment in work or home responsibilities; there were many important things I couldn’t 
do because of these problems. 
4 Extreme, incapacitating impairment such that I was essentially unable to manage any work or home 
responsibilities. 
 
7. During the past week, how much did panic and limited symptom attacks, worry about attacks and 
fear of situations and activities because of attacks interfere with your social life? (If you didn’t have 
many opportunities to socialize this past week, answer how you think you would have done if you did 
have opportunities.) 
0 No interference 
1 Slight interference with social activities, but I could do nearly everything I could if I didn’t have these 
problems. 
2 Significant interference with social activities but I could manage to do most things if I made the 
effort. 
3 Substantial impairment in social activities; there are many social things I couldn’t do because of 
these problems. 
4 Extreme, incapacitating impairment, such that there was hardly anything social I could do. 
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Here are some outline descriptions of situations in which it is not quite clear what is 
happening. Below the descriptions you will see three possible explanations for the situations. 
After you have read each description arrange the possible explanations in the order in which 
they would be most likely to come to your mind if you found yourself in a similar situation. 
So the one that you would consider most likely to be true should come first, and the one that 
you would consider least likely to be true should come third. Do not think too long before 
deciding. We want you first impressions, and do not worry if none of them fits with what you 
actually did.   
1. You have visitors round for a meal and they leave sooner than expected, why? 
 
a. They did not wish to outstay their welcome 
 
b. They had another pressing engagement to go to 
 
c. They did not enjoy the visit and were bored with your company 
 
 
2. You feel short of breath, why? 
 
a. You are developing the flu 
b. You are about to suffocate or stop breathing 
c. You are physically “out of shape” 
 
3. Your vision has become slightly blurred, why? 
 
a. You have strained your eyes slightly 
b. You need to get glasses or change your existing glasses 
c. This is the sign of a serious illness 
 
4. You go into a shop and the assistant ignores you, why? 
 
a. They are bored with their job, and this makes them rude 
 
b. They are concentrating very hard on something else 
 
c. They find you irritating and resent your presence 
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5. You feel light headed and weak, why? 
 
a. You are about to faint 
b. You need to get something to eat 
c. You didn’t get enough sleep last night 
 
6. You smell smoke, why? 
 
a. Your house is on fire 
 
b. Some food is burning 
 
c. Someone is smoking a cigarette 
 
 
7. A friend suggest that you change the way that you’re doing a job in your own house, 
why? 
 
a. They are trying to be helpful 
 
b. They think that you’re incompetent 
 
c. They have done the job more often and know an easier way 
 
 
8. Your chest feels uncomfortable and tight, why? 
 
a. You have indigestion 
b. You have a sore muscle 
c. Something is wrong with your heart 
9. You wake with a start in the middle of the night, thinking you heard a noise, but all is 
quiet. What woke you up? 
 
a. You were woken by a dream 
 
b. A burglar broke into your house 
 
c. A door or window rattled in the wind 
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10. You are introduced to someone at a party who fails to reply to a question you ask 
them, why? 
 
a. They did not hear the question 
 
b. They think you are uninteresting and boring 
 
c. They are preoccupied with something else at the time 
 
 
11. You notice your heart is beating quickly and pounding, why? 
 
a. Because you have been physically active 
b. Because there is something wrong with your heart 
c. Because you are excited 
 
12. You suddenly feel confused and are having difficulty in thinking straight, why? 
 
a. You are going out of your mind 
b. You are coming down with a cold 
c. You’ve been working too hard and need a rest 
 
13. A letter marked “URGENT” arrives in the post. What is in the letter? 
 
a. It is a circular designed to attract your attention 
 
b. You forgot to pay a bill 
 
c. News that someone you know has died or is seriously ill 
 
 
14. You notice that your heart is pounding, you feel breathless, dizzy and unreal, why? 
 
a. You have been overdoing it and are overtired 
b. Something you ate disagreed with you 
c. You are dangerously ill or going mad 
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Now that you have answered the preceding questions we would be grateful if you would 
answer one more question about each of the ambiguous situations. Please return to the start of 
the questions and then rate the extent to which you think each of the three explanations for a 
situation would be like to be true if you found yourself in that situation. 
 
Use the scale below for your ratings. Put a number between 0 and 8 next to each of the 
three explanations in the text. Do not worry if your ratings appear to be different from your 
previous answers, and please do not change any of your original answers. 
0 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - 7 - - - - - 8 
Not at all                    A Little                    Moderately                   Very                  Extremely 
  likely                                                                                                                            likely 
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Please rate the extent to which you have been distressed by the symptoms highlighted below over the 
past 24 hours. Mark on the line and number the extent of which each statement below is true. 
Today bodily sensations have been distressing for me 
 
 
                                 0         100 
           Not at all               Excessively 
 
Today feelings of unreality have been distressing for me 
 
 
 
         0                                 100 
  Not at all                 Excessively 
 
Today feelings of losing control have been distressing for me 
 
 
         0             100 
  Not at all       Excessively 
 
Today feelings that I am going to die have been distressing for me 
 
  
 
                               0                                                                                           100 
                        Not at all                                                                               Excessively 
Appendix J: Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Research Approval 
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Participant Information Sheet 
A single case series investigation of the efficacy of an internet delivered multi-
session cognitive bias modification – interpretation task in a population with 
clinical levels of Panic Disorder 
Researcher: James Hampson  
Research Supervisor: Dr Margo Ononaiye 
 
Invitation Paragraph  
You are being invited to take part in a research study, which is being undertaken as 
part of a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology qualification. Before you decide, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it 
with others or the researcher if you wish. Ask the researcher if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not 
you wish to take part. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
People who have frequent reoccurring panic attacks, often for no obvious reason, 
may have Panic Disorder. People who have Panic Disorder are believed to interpret 
bodily sensations in a catastrophic manner. People with Panic Disorder may 
overlook other possible reasons for these bodily symptoms. Research into Panic 
Disorder has suggested that the catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations 
contributes to the development and maintenance of Panic Disorder. It is believed 
that by modifying these misinterpretations to look at bodily sensations in a different 
way will help reduce symptoms of Panic Disorder. The research aims to better 
understand how helpful changing these interpretation biases may be.  
The aim of the study is to investigate whether Cognitive Bias Modification for 
Interpretation (CBM-I), an internet delivered computer programme delivered daily 
over 7 days, helps reduce levels of Panic and negative interpretation biases. The
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researchers are trying to find out whether CBM-I might be a useful therapeutic tool to 
use in the future for other individuals who may have Panic Disorder. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
We are approaching people who are experiencing clinical levels of Panic Disorder 
through NHS teams and through Wellbeing and Counselling services at the 
University of East Anglia. Equally, you may have responded to a poster or email 
advertisement or heard about the study through word of mouth and been keen to 
participate. Individuals referred from NHS and Wellbeing and Counselling services 
will have been referred by clinicians working within these teams. It is these people 
that will have first contacted you, to ensure confidentiality.  
There will be approximately 9 participants selected in this way for the study. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form. 
If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving 
a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not 
affect the standard of care you receive. If you do withdraw or in the unlikely event 
that you lose capacity to consent, the data collected up until this point may still be 
used.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do agree to take part, you will meet or speak with the researcher who will ask 
about your current problems. You will be asked to fill in some questionnaires which 
shouldn’t take more than half an hour and the whole session will last about an hour. 
If you are referred to participate in the study by an NHS team you can choose 
whether to meet the researcher in your own home or an NHS premises. Should you 
be referred by the Wellbeing and Counselling services at the University of East 
Anglia, or respond to a poster or email advertisement, you can choose whether to 
meet the researcher on campus or in your own home. You will be allocated to a 
length of assessment period which could be between seven and eleven days. During 
this time, you will be asked to complete three short measures about Panic Disorder 
every day; these will take no longer than ten minutes. If you would like, the 
researcher can email or text you to remind you to fill these out.  
Once this assessment phase (seven, nine or eleven days later) is complete and all 
the measures returned to the researcher, the researcher will arrange to meet with 
you again to complete the same measures that you did at the start. The researcher 
will also show you how to access the programme for the intervention phase. The 
programme is easy to use and you will be provided with clear and concise 
instructions. 
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The treatment phase (CBM-I) will last for seven consecutive days, whereby you must 
try to complete the CBM-I computer programme at home every day at a time that 
suits you. This should take around 30 minutes. You can have breaks in between the 
training material if this is needed. The same daily measures that you did before 
should also be completed. The researcher, if you choose, will send you text 
messages or emails to remind you to do this. If you get stuck, then you can always 
contact the researcher on the details given below. 
After completing the seven day treatment phase, the researcher will meet with you 
again to ask you to complete the some more short questionnaires. You will then be 
contacted by the researcher one week later to see how you are getting on and to 
complete the same questionnaires again. The researcher will also ask for your 
feedback on the computer programme and whether you feel it has helped or not. The 
information taken from this feedback will be used in to write a separate piece of 
research exploring participants’ experience of an internet delivered CBM-I package. 
How long will I be involved for? 
Participation in this research will last between twenty one to twenty five days. If you 
are on a waitlist for other therapy you may be asked to wait to begin this until the 
study completion. This will not affect your place on the waitlist and will be discussed 
with the appropriate clinician or service. The researcher also asks you to inform them 
of any anxiety medication you are taking and notify the researcher of any changes in 
medication during the study.         
Expenses and payments 
We are not able to offer reimbursements of travel costs or expenses. For the most 
part however, the researcher is happy to visit you in your home, as long as this okay 
with you.   
As a thank you for taking part in the study you will be entered into a prize draw to win 
one of three prizes. These prizes are likely to be high street vouchers. 
What do I have to do?  
As mentioned above, the therapeutic tool we are trialling is called Cognitive Bias 
Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I). It is a computer programme containing 
training materials that has proven to help people with high levels of anxiety appraise 
or interpret situations in a different way. The researcher will show you how to use 
this programme guiding you through the first session and you will be provided with 
clear instructions and a troubleshooting guide. The programme is easy to use with 
on-screen instructions.   
 You will be presented on the screen with various scenarios and all you have to do is 
complete the sentence. You are asked to imagine yourself in these situations. There 
is only one possible solution to complete the sentence. You will be required to repeat 
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this using different scenarios 50 times during each daily session. The scenarios will 
be split in to groups of 10 and you are welcome to have a break in between. You are 
also needed to complete the daily measures, which take around 5-10 minutes to 
complete. It is really important for you to complete the daily sessions and the daily 
measures. If you would like reminding, the researcher can send you a daily text or 
email.  
It is important that you do not consume alcohol or recreational drugs when 
completing the measures or when using the computer programme as not to influence 
the results of the study. It is also important to complete the tasks at a suitable time, 
in suitable surroundings and preferably free from distraction. 
During your final assessment session you will be asked to take part in a short 
interview, exploring your experiences of the CBM-I programme and any changes this 
may have brought. This part of the final session will recorded, so that the researcher 
can accurately transcribe the feedback you give. You will have the opportunity to 
read this transcription to make sure it is a true reflection of what was discussed. The 
recordings will be anonymous, stored in a locked filing cabinet and destroyed at the 
end of the study. The information obtained during the interview will be used in a 
separate service based research project that aims to explore participant’s 
experiences of using an internet delivered CBM-I programme. 
What is the programme being tested? 
The aim of CBM-I for Panic Disorder is to help people interpret ambiguous bodily 
symptoms in a less negative way. By repeated practice of interpreting panic related 
scenarios differently it is hoped that this will translate in to real life scenarios, which 
is why it is really important for you to imagine yourself in the situations. We know that 
negative interpretation biases are common within those who have Panic Disorder 
and are a maintaining factor in Panic Disorder. If the CBM-I training materials can 
help make these more positive, it is hoped that Panic symptomatology may be 
reduced. As this reflects early stages of clinical research, it is anticipated that CBM-I 
will be most beneficial alongside other treatments for Panic Disorder and enhance 
them. 
What are the alternatives for treatment? 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is the main therapy available to help people 
who are experiencing Panic Disorder. CBM-I is being developed to supplement or be 
an extension of CBT. It may also be beneficial to those people on a waitlist for CBT 
or other treatments. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are few disadvantages to taking part. If you have been referred to participate 
in the study from a NHS or UEA counselling and wellbeing service, participation may 
result in delayed onset of alternative treatments if they have been offered to by 
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between 4 to 5 weeks, however participation will not affect your routine clinical care. 
There is no suggestion or evidence that completion of CBM-I worsens Panic related 
symptoms.   
The various assessments and completion of questionnaires required may briefly 
disrupt your day-to-day routine as it may take up to an hour of your day. This is 
required for only one week. Some people may perceive the repetition of the training 
materials to be tedious, however it is this aspect of repeated practice that is hoped to 
change the autonomous way of interpreting information. Much like repeated exercise 
helps keep the body fit.      
 What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The aim of CBM-I is to help people to feel less worried and stressed about certain 
bodily symptoms. We hope that the CBM-I programme will help you. However, this 
cannot be guaranteed. The information we get from this study may help us treat 
future patients with Panic Disorder more effectively.   
What happens when the research study stops? 
When the research study finishes, all participants will receive normal care from the 
service you have already been in contact with or that referred you to this research. If 
you chose to delay the onset of any other intervention until study completion, the 
service offering this will be in contact.  
What happens if something goes wrong? 
In the unlikely event that you are harmed by taking part in a research project, there 
are no special compensation arrangements. If you are harmed by someone’s 
negligence you may have grounds for legal action but you may have to pay for it. 
Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect 
of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of the study, the 
normal National Health Service complaints procedures should be available to you. 
Should you not be referred from a NHS team please contact Dr Margo Ononaiye, 
Research Supervisor.   Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with 
during the study will be addressed.  
In the event that you become distressed while participating in the study, please 
contact the researcher James Hampson in the first instance. If the researcher is not 
available please contact your GP services or primary care contact. In the event that 
this outside of normal working hours please contact your out of hours GP service, or 
the NHS 111 service (telephone: 111).  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
If you consent to take part in the study the researcher will speak with the clinician or 
team that referred you. All information that is collected about you during the course 
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of the research will be kept strictly confidential. If the researcher is worried about risk 
to yourself or others during the course of the research then some information may 
need to be disclosed to relevant persons. In the unlikely event of this occurring it 
would be discussed with you first. 
Any information about you that leaves  or University premises will have your name 
and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it, You will be allocated 
a participant number to help with this. If you consent, the researcher will inform your 
GP and the team responsible for your care about your involvement in the study. The 
researcher will send them a very brief summary of our assessment unless you do not 
wish us to do this.  
Results and research data, with personal information removed will be looked at by 
my research supervisors. Dr Margo Ononaiye (Research Supervisor) will also have 
access to some personal details such as names, addresses and phone numbers in 
case a second point of contact is needed by yourself. These details will be kept 
securely and your name and contact details stored separately using your participant 
number to help ensure confidentiality.  
Where and how long will records be stored? 
Data will be stored in locked cabinets in local health care or university premises. It 
will be kept for 5 years after the completion of the study and then destroyed.  
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be reported as anonymous data. The study will be seen 
by colleagues and supervisors at the University of East Anglia, Doctoral programme 
in psychology and other members of the research team. Results may also become 
available more publicly if the research is published, however no identifiable material 
will be published.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The study has been designed by James Hampson Trainee Clinical Psychologist who 
is a student from the University of East Anglia and research supervisors. The 
research is being carried out as part of training for a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. It is hoped that this research will further the CBM literature and develop 
the use of CBM as a therapeutic tool. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been considered and approved by the NHS Research Ethics 
Committee. The research has also been reviewed and approved by the University of 
East Anglia.  
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Thank you for reading this. If you need further information, please contact the 
researcher directly. The researcher will give you this information sheet to keep as 
well as a signed consent form if you agree to take part in the study. 
Contact for further information: 
If you would like any more information about the study or need to contact the 
researcher, please feel free to contact James Hampson (Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist) or Margo Ononaiye (Research Supervisor): 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
University of East Anglia 
Queens Building 
Norwich 
Norfolk 
NR4 7TJ 
Tel: 01603 593600 (Mon-Fri, 9am – 5pm) 
Email: j.hampson@uea.ac.uk 
Participants referred from NHS services: For independent advice on participating 
in research, you can also contact your local Patient Advice and Liaison Service 
(PALS) at CPFT, Elizabeth House, Fulbourn Hospital, Cambridge, CB21 5EF or 
telephone 01223 726789.   
Participants not referred from NHS services: Should you have any complaints 
regarding the conduct of the research please contact Dr Margo Ononaiye, (Research 
Supervisor). 
Version: 5 
 
Date: 06/03/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix L: E-Bulletin Content 
166 
 
Volunteers are sought for a psychology study examining a computer program which seeks to 
reduce levels of panic. 
If you choose to take part, you will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires and a 
complete a computer-based task over seven consecutive days, with each computer task 
lasting approximately 45 minutes.  
 
Participants will be entered into a prize draw for a £10 high street voucher.  
 
To express interest, email James Hampson (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) at 
j.hampson@uea.ac.uk  
 
Version: 1 
Date: 10/02/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix M: Consent Form 
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Patient Identification Number for this study: ……………. 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project:   Modifying Interpretation Biases in Panic Disorder 
Name of Researcher: James Hampson        
                                                    Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
had these answered satisfactorily.                                                                                                                                                    
2. I understand that participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.                                                                                                                                           
3. If I withdraw from the study, I am willing for information that I have provided 
during the course of the study to be used for research purposes, as stated in the 
information sheet. 
4. I will inform the researcher of any changes in medication during my involvement 
in the study, including dates of the change, dose and name of the medication.                                                                                                                                 
5.   I am willing for my GP and/or care team/clinician involved to be informed of my 
participation and completion of this project, and for assessment information to be 
shared with my GP and/or care team.          
6. I give my consent for a qualitative semi-structured interview and for a recording of 
this to be made. I understand that this is for the purposes of transcribing 
information that will be used as data in a separate service based research project.   
7. I understand that I can choose to withdraw from the study or delay any other 
therapy or intervention, if offered during my participation. I understand that if this 
occurs it will be negotiated with the relevant care team/clinician and therapy will 
commence at the earliest opportunity after my participation in the above study.    
8. I agree to take part in the above study.                                        
______________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Patient Date Signature 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature  
Version: 5 
Date: 06/03/2014 
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Appendix O: Kendall’s Tau Statistical Output 
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Nonparametric Correlations - PDSS 
 
 
 Baseline7 Participant1 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .651
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .046 
N 7 7 
Participant1 Correlation Coefficient .651
*
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .046 . 
N 7 7 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Baseline7 Participant2 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .109 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .748 
N 7 7 
Participant2 Correlation Coefficient .109 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .748 . 
N 7 7 
 
 Baseline9 Participant3 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.340 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .225 
N 9 9 
Participant3 Correlation Coefficient -.340 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .225 . 
N 9 9 
 
 Baseline11 Participant4 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.274 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .278 
N 11 11 
Participant4 Correlation Coefficient -.274 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .278 . 
N 11 11 
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 Baseline9 Participant5 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.189 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .506 
N 9 9 
Participant5 Correlation Coefficient -.189 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .506 . 
N 9 9 
 
 Baseline11 Participant6 
Kendall's tau_b Baseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.458 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .057 
N 11 11 
Participant6 Correlation Coefficient -.458 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .057 . 
N 11 11 
Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 1  
 
 VASbaseline7 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.169 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .622 
N 7 7 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient -.169 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .622 . 
N 7 7 
 
 
 VASbaseline7 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 7 7 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 7 7 
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 VASbaseline7 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .451 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .167 
N 7 7 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient .451 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .167 . 
N 7 7 
 
 
 VASbaseline7 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.117 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .734 
N 7 7 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient -.117 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .734 . 
N 7 7 
Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 2 
 
 VASbaseline7 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.117 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .734 
N 7 7 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient -.117 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .734 . 
N 7 7 
 
 
 VASbaseline7 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .394 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .250 
N 7 7 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient .394 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .250 . 
N 7 7 
 
 
 VASbaseline7 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.504 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .157 
N 7 7 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient -.504 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .157 . 
N 7 7 
 
 
 VASbaseline7 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .117 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .734 
N 7 7 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient .117 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .734 . 
N 7 7 
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Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 3 
 VASbaseline9 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.031 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .913 
N 9 9 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient -.031 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .913 . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .313 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .288 
N 9 9 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient .313 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .288 . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.382 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .194 
N 9 9 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient -.382 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .194 . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 4 
 
 VASbaseline11 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .250 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .318 
N 11 11 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient .250 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .318 . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 VASbaseline11 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.108 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .674 
N 11 11 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient -.108 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .674 . 
N 11 11 
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 VASbaseline11 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .106 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .687 
N 11 11 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient .106 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .687 . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 VASbaseline11 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 11 11 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 11 11 
Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 5 
 
 VASbaseline9 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.435 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .112 
N 9 9 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient -.435 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112 . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
 
 
 VASbaseline9 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline9 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 9 9 
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Nonparametric Correlations - Participant 6 
 
 VASbaseline11 BodilyVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.449 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .059 
N 11 11 
BodilyVAS Correlation Coefficient -.449 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .059 . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 VASbaseline11 UnrealityVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.315 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .183 
N 11 11 
UnrealityVAS Correlation Coefficient -.315 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .183 . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 VASbaseline11 ControlVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.330 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .160 
N 11 11 
ControlVAS Correlation Coefficient -.330 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .160 . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 VASbaseline11 DyingVAS 
Kendall's tau_b VASbaseline11 Correlation Coefficient 1.000 . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 11 11 
DyingVAS Correlation Coefficient . . 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
N 11 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix P: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical Output 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test - Group Effects 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
ASIint - ASIpre Negative Ranks 4
a
 3.50 14.00 
Positive Ranks 1
b
 1.00 1.00 
Ties 1
c
   
Total 6   
a. ASIint < ASIpre 
b. ASIint > ASIpre 
c. ASIint = ASIpre 
 
Test Statistics
b
 
 ASIint – ASIpre 
Z -1.753
a
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .080 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
ASIfu - ASIpre Negative Ranks 5
a
 3.80 19.00 
Positive Ranks 1
b
 2.00 2.00 
Ties 0
c
   
Total 6   
a. ASIfu < ASIpre 
b. ASIfu > ASIpre 
c. ASIfu = ASIpre 
Test Statistics
b
 
 ASIfu - ASIpre 
Z -1.782
a
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .075 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
PDSSpost - PDSSpre Negative Ranks 6
a
 3.50 21.00 
Positive Ranks 0
b
 .00 .00 
Ties 0
c
   
Total 6   
PDSSfu - PDSSpre Negative Ranks 5
d
 4.00 20.00 
Positive Ranks 1
e
 1.00 1.00 
Ties 0
f
   
Total 6   
RANKpost - RANKpre Negative Ranks 4
g
 2.50 10.00 
Positive Ranks 0
h
 .00 .00 
Ties 2
i
   
Total 6   
RANKfu - RANKpre Negative Ranks 4
j
 3.50 14.00 
Positive Ranks 1
k
 1.00 1.00 
Ties 1
l
   
Total 6   
BELIEVEpost - BELIEVEpre Negative Ranks 4
m
 3.50 14.00 
Positive Ranks 1
n
 1.00 1.00 
Ties 0
o
   
Total 5   
BELIEVEfu - BELIEVEpre Negative Ranks 4
p
 3.50 14.00 
Positive Ranks 1
q
 1.00 1.00 
Ties 0
r
   
Total 5   
a. PDSSpost < PDSSpre 
b. PDSSpost > PDSSpre 
c. PDSSpost = PDSSpre 
d. PDSSfu < PDSSpre 
e. PDSSfu > PDSSpre 
f. PDSSfu = PDSSpre 
g. RANKpost < RANKpre 
h. RANKpost > RANKpre 
i. RANKpost = RANKpre 
j. RANKfu < RANKpre 
k. RANKfu > RANKpre 
l. RANKfu = RANKpre 
m. BELIEVEpost < BELIEVEpre 
n. BELIEVEpost > BELIEVEpre 
o. BELIEVEpost = BELIEVEpre 
p. BELIEVEfu < BELIEVEpre 
q. BELIEVEfu > BELIEVEpre 
r. BELIEVEfu = BELIEVEpre 
 
Test Statistics
b
 
 
PDSSpost – 
PDSSpre 
PDSSfu - 
PDSSpre 
RANKpost - 
RANKpre 
RANKfu - 
RANKpre 
Z -2.207
a
 -1.992
a
 -1.826
a
 -1.753
a
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .046 .068 .080 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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 BELIEVEpost – 
BELIEVEpre 
BELIEVEfu - 
BELIEVEpre 
Z -1.753
a
 -1.753
a
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .080 .080 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Q: Imagery Correlation Output 
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Nonparametric Correlations - Imagery 
 
Correlations 
 
 MeanImagery PDSSprePost 
Spearman's rho MeanImagery Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.116 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .413 
N 6 6 
PDSSprePost Correlation Coefficient -.116 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .413 . 
N 6 6 
 
Correlations 
 
 MeanImagery PDSSpreFU 
Spearman's rho MeanImagery Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.486 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .164 
N 6 6 
PDSSpreFU Correlation Coefficient -.486 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .164 . 
N 6 6 
 
Correlations 
 
 MeanImagery ASIprePost 
Spearman's rho MeanImagery Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.314 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .272 
N 6 6 
ASIprePost Correlation Coefficient -.314 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .272 . 
N 6 6 
 
Correlations 
 
 MeanImagery ASIpreFU 
Spearman's rho MeanImagery Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.486 
Sig. (1-tailed) . .164 
N 6 6 
ASIpreFU Correlation Coefficient -.486 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .164 . 
N 6 6 
 
 
 
 
 
